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Summary
This thesis is composed of three essays on rational bubbles in the price of
investment goods, their effects on the economy as a trigger of economic
crises, and policy implications.
The first chapter develops the model of bubbles in the price of durable
investment goods in a small open economy incorporating the common ele-
ments from the observation of crises: optimism, price boom-bust episode,
intense capital gain, over-construction and over-utilization of factory build-
ings (relative to the economy with no bubble), and severe recession. Per-
manent bubbles in durable investment goods require the growth rate of the
world economy to be higher than a threshold which is at least equal to the
world’s interest rate. This can occur if the world is suffering from inefficient
investment or financial imperfection. This condition is stronger than nor-
mal condition required for bubbles elaborated in the literature: the growth
rate of the economy must be at least equal to the interest rate which can
occur if the world is suffering from inefficient investment or financial im-
perfection. The reason is because the supply of durable investment goods
is endogenously influenced by bubbly price itself. Thereby, the value of
bubbles grows faster than the rate of interest. In other words, inefficient
investment or financial imperfection is a necessary condition, but may not
be sufficient condition for the existence of permanent bubbles.
viii
In contrast, stochastic bubbles can always emerge in a small open econ-
omy. Since bubbles are expected to crash to the fundamental price level,
bubbles are expected to be financially sustained by the large amount of in-
ternational savings from the rest of the world in the form of capital inflow.
Hence, stochastic bubbles can emerge even in the world with no growth.
This shows how vulnerable a small open economy can be against stochastic
bubbles.
To complete the framework, the first chapter also provides an attempt
to endogenise initial bubbles using an asymmetric information argument. In
the presence of the interest rate shock, the hidden information about the
shareholders’ preferences brings about the ambiguity in the firm’s policy on
re-investing in bubbly assets. As a result, banks lend out based on the worst
scenario: no loan is re-invested in bubbly assets at all. Hence, any actual
re-investment can set up bubbles.
Nonetheless, some important features are missing in the first chapter’s
analysis: the dynamics in the credit market and the role of the credit con-
straint. The second chapter fulfills these by introducing the bond-financing
and the limited pledgeability. While all key features of bubbles are still
maintained, some new insights about the financial accelerator and the ex-
posure to default risk are revealed. In particular, when bubbles grow, the
pledgeable income increases and there is more credit provision. This pos-
itive feedback loop, known as balance-sheet effect, allows bubbles to grow
further and makes the economy very sensitive to the movement of the asset
price. In addition, bubbles encourage risk-neutral banks to become more
risk-taking. Owing to the competition in credit market, banks are willing
to raise the lending rate and grant the loan beyond the fundamental value
of the pledgeable income at the cost of the default when bubbles crash.
ix
The second chapter also shows the role of the credit constraint. The
credit constraint has no major part in sustaining bubbles as the reason
bubbles can be sustained is purely due to the inefficiency in the world’s
investment. However, the credit constraint can naturally help endogenise
initial bubbles via the following speculative-borrowing game. Particularly,
the unexpected fall in the world’s interest rate potentially raises the asset
price, which implies the extra capital gain for those who invest early. Then,
every investor would borrow up the credit limit to re-invest in the asset in
the hope of raising the asset price even higher to maximize this gain. The
resulting price can be above the fundamental level and hence bubbles start.
Lastly, the third chapter offers the policy analysis. To prevent bubbles,
the positive feedback loop between bubbles and an ability to borrow must
be cut. Firstly, the first-best policy, which can prevent bubbles without
affecting the fundamental price level, is recommended by regulating the de-
gree of collateralization. When the degree of collateralization is ruled to
maintain the ability to borrow at the fundamental value of the pledgeable
income, bubbles can no longer emerge. The rationale is that bubbles in-
duce more supply of bubbly assets and hence lower the fundamental price
level. The policy thus ensures that the credit provision is decreased along
the dynamics of bubbles and hence bubbles cannot eventually be sustained.
Yet, this first-best policy requires the policymaker a deep knowledge of asset
price which is hard to implement. Instead, the second-best policy is sug-
gested. One realistic example of such policy is the imposition of the margin
constraint. The margin constraint requires investors to finance bubbles pro-
portionally by their own internal fund. If bubbles emerged, this required
internal funding would outgrow the wage income and hence bubbles could
not exist. Although such policy is easy to implement, the shortcoming is
xthat it partially suppresses the fundamental of the economy since it overall
limits the credit provision. In the last section of the chapter, the speculative
tax policy against bubbles is analyzed. As a result, the effectiveness of the
policy is subject to the coordination of belief among agents. The policy may
be very effective by eliminating all speculation and bubbles, or only ruling
out speculation but not bubbles, or in the worst case reversely intensifying
bubble appreciation while speculation still continues.
Chapter 1




Asset price bubbles have extensively been studied by macroeconomists for
past decades. The increasing interest in bubbles results from an empirical
fact that a boom-bust episode of bubbles is involved in many economic crises
throughout history; for example, Japan’s bubble bursting in early 1990s,
the East Asian crisis in late 1990s, and Subprime crisis in late 2000s. The
collapse of asset price bubbles has been suspected as a culprit for these eco-
nomic breakdowns. Since the crash and the following recession are evidently
painful, understanding how bubbles emerge, grow, and burst is crucial for
the policymaker to prevent such catastrophe.
A definition of bubbles is the difference between the prevailing asset
price and its fundamental price, which is commonly defined as the discounted
2stream of its dividends- see Santos and Woodford [40]. There are two stances
of the literature on bubbles. The first stance is irrational bubbles which focus
on the speculative nature of bubbles driven by some irrational traders or
traders with their optimistic belief; for example, see Harrison and Kreps [20].
The second stance is rational bubbles which appear as rational expectation
equilibrium. The study in this thesis is categorized under the latter stance.
The existence of rational bubbles has been a challenge for macroeconomists.
It has been shown that the existence of bubbles would normally violate some
conditions required in the general equilibrium economy. In the finite-horizon
economy, bubbles cannot emerge since the asset would have no value at the
last period, hence bubbles are ruled out by typical backward induction- see
Tirole [42]. In the infinite-horizon economy with infinite-lived agents, having
bubbles in equilibrium might violate the transversality condition. That is,
agents still have not spent all their wealth which implies that their behaviors
are actually not optimal- see Obstfeld and Rogoff [36].
In the infinite-horizon economy with finite-lived agents like the overlap-
ping generations model, bubbles need to satisfy two properties. First, the
appreciation of bubbles must be sufficiently substantial to match the rate of
return on investment (gross interest rate). Second, since the economy has
a certain amount of savings, bubbles cannot outgrow the economy; other-
wise, bubbles cannot be sustained and then are ruled out by the standard
backward induction. Hence, it is suggested that the long-term growth of the
bubbleless economy must be above the interest rate for bubbles to emerge.
To keep the interest rate at the low level, the existing literature suggests
that the economy must either be suffering from the inefficient investment
or being credit-constrained. In the former case, the economy lacks stores
of value for agents to transfer their wealth to the future and consequently
3causes the excessive investment, resulting in the low interest rate. Bubbles
help absorb the savings from the inefficient investment and raise the rate
of return as in Caballero and Krishnamurthy [5], Tirole [43] , Ventura [44],
and Martin and Ventura [33]. In the latter case, the credit constraint limits
the rate of return of the borrowed fund to be less than the rate of return
of the investment. When the pledgeability is low and the outside liquidity
is scarce, the equilibrium interest rate can be lower than the growth rate
of the economy in spite of the fact that the economy is still dynamically
efficient. Reallocation of savings to bubbles can increase the interest rate;
for example, see Kocherlakota [24, 25], and Farhi and Tirole [13].1
The classic work of Tirole [43] is considered as a breakthrough of the
literature on bubbles. However, there are two major problems over his
work. First, bubbles can exist forever without a crash which is not realistic.
Second, his model creates bubbles that crowd out investment. This is also
inconsistent with empirical evidence in the economic boom period when
investment boom occurs along with consumption boom. This is because
in his model, bubbles compete with investment over savings. Hence, many
subsequent works try to reconcile these shortcomings.
For instance, Weil [45] introduces the possibility of losing trust in the
overlapping generations model which leads to the sunspot bubbly equilib-
rium: when trust is lost, bubbles collapse to the fundamental price once
and for all. Farhi and Tirole [13] create the framework where bubbles are
used as saving vehicle for the future investment, so bubbles can crowd in
investment. Martin and Ventura [33] consider sunspot equilibrium in the
1Under different interpretations, bubbles sometimes result from multiple-equilibrium
nature of the model. In similar vein as the second-generation class of economic crisis
models, multiple equilibriums may leads to the sunspot equilibrium where the economy
can switch from one to another equilibrium with positive probability- see Diamond and
Dybvig [8] and Chang and Velasco [7].
4world of inefficient and efficient investment coexistence. Then, bubbles ab-
sorb savings from the inefficient and help increase the efficient investment.
Thereby, bubbles can crowd in investment.
This thesis also offers an alternative theoretical framework to overcome
the shortcomings of Tirole [43]. Two crucial features distinguish our frame-
work from the existing literature. First, instead of having bubbles as alter-
native assets that compete with investment for savings, we study bubbles
in the price of durable investment goods with endogenous supply which is
called as factory buildings throughout the text. In this way, bubbles natu-
rally crowd in investment. Studying bubbles in this class of assets is thus
practically useful in explaining economic crises as bubble-induced events.
Glaeser Gyourko and Saiz [17] emphasize the necessity of including supply
side into the analysis on housing market. However, in their model they con-
clude that with elastic supply bubbles cannot occur since the perpetually
rising supply would exceed potential purchasing power of buyers. Second,
we analyze bubbles in a small open economy. A small open economy is a
special and interesting environment that can take advantage of world’s sav-
ings for its own sake. Using this characteristic, we focus on how a small
open economy utilizes the world’s resource on bubbles and takes the world
economy as given. In other words, we do not attempt to rationalize why
the world’s interest rate is below the growth rate of the world (which many
works have done as aforementioned), but rather study necessary and suf-
ficient conditions of the world economy that allows bubbles to emerge in
a small open economy. Other than the technical reason, studying a small
open economy is important due to many historical evidences on how vulner-
able it is against bubbles. According to Dubach and Li [11], and Leightner
[30, 31], in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea during the East Asian cri-
5sis in 1990s, bubbles occurred in the price of housing, office space, and land,
which are not substitutes for investment but rather investment themselves.2
The boom in property market results in consumption and investment booms,
which eventually end with a crash of bubbles in 1997.
Four main contributions are obtained as follows. First, we find that a
stronger condition is required for bubbles without crash to exist. Normally,
the literature states that having the growth rate of economy higher than the
interest rate is sufficient for the emergence of permanent bubbles. However,
this is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition for permanent
bubbles in durable investment goods. The reason is that the supply of invest-
ment goods is endogenously affected by its bubbly price and grows faster.
Hence, the value of bubbles grows at even higher rate such that having the
growth rate of economy just equal to the interest rate may not be enough
to sustain them. Second, we show that no restriction on the world’s growth
rate is required for stochastic bubbles to emerge in a small open economy.
Simply put, if the crash of bubbles is expected to occur in the future, bub-
bles can emerge even in the world with no growth. This is because a small
open economy benefits from its insignificant size and absorbs the world’s re-
source to fuel bubbles. As long as bubbles will crash, the world’s resource is
expected to always be adequate to finance them. Third, we apply the global
analysis of the dynamical system which is technically superior to the local
analysis normally adopted in the literature. This is a technical contribu-
tion that allows us to study the non-stationary sunspot equilibrium. Lastly,
we provide a separate mechanism in which the unexpected capital gain and
asymmetric information between firms and banks play an important role
for bubbles to initially emerge and uniquely be determined. Consistent with
2Houses can be thought as inputs for home production.
6the literature, bubbles must exogenously exist in the first day of trading- see
Diba and Grossman [9, 10] and Jarrow, Protter, and Shimboposits [21]. To
complete the story of bubble-induced economic crises, we show that given
a shock in the world’s interest rate, the unexpected capital gain and asym-
metric information between firms and banks can set up the initial bubbles.3
An unanticipated drop in the world’s interest rate raises the fundamental
value of the factory stock and induces the extra capital gain to firms that
own all factory stock. Being aware of a moral hazard problem, banks grant
the loan against that capital gain conservatively- as if no loan is used to fac-
tory re-investment. Hence, the actual re-investment in factory buildings can
increase the factory price above the fundamental value and set up bubbles.
The simple model outlined in this chapter can successfully illustrate the
boom-bust episode of bubbles. This boom-bust episode is consistent with
the empirical pattern of a phenomenon commonly referred to as Sudden
Stops. According to Mendoza [34], the Sudden Stop is characterized by the
following stylized features: the correction of the asset price, the reversal of
international capital flows, and the reduction in domestic production. Dur-
ing the bubble boom, rising price of factory buildings and the increasing
factory stock bring about high growth rate of the economy. When bubbles
burst, the factory price plummets to the fundamental price level. Devalu-
ation of factory buildings causes great losses to firms. Foreign investment
is reduced and so is capital inflow. Over-construction of factory buildings
over the boom leads to the over-utilization and low fundamental price. The
prolonged recession is observed as the economy converges through the fun-
damental price path toward the steady state.
3The importance of the asymmetric information on bubble emergence is highlighted
in the asset pricing literature, for instance herding behavior and information cascades in
[4, 14, 28]
7The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the economy.
Then, we analyze the equilibrium of the economy and determine the fun-
damental price in Section 3. Based on the fundamental price, the sunspot
equilibrium is constructed in Section 4. To complete the framework, the
attempt to endogenise initial bubbles is provided in Section 5. In Section
6, we study effects of bubbles on economy, especially the economic crises.
The welfare analysis is given in Section 7 and last but not least Section 8
concludes the chapter.
1.2 Setup
Consider an overlapping generations model of a small open economy with
two-period-lived agents and perfect international capital mobility. The econ-
omy faces the fixed world’s interest rate r∗ ∈ ℜ+ and all markets are com-
petitive. The world is growing at (gross) rate g ∈ [1,∞).
This economy has two productive sectors. Sector 1 produces factory
buildings while sector 2 produces consumption goods.4 The price of con-
sumption goods is set equal to 1 as the numeraire. Denote pt ∈ ℜ++ as the
period t price of factory buildings in term of consumption goods. In addition,
real estate companies which specialize in a property market are introduced.
These companies possess all factory buildings. All productive firms and real
estate companies are financed by equity which can be purchased by both
domestic and foreign investors.5
Each generation is populated with two types of consumers; n1 ∈ N con-
4The two-sector feature of the model is for modeling tractability and not crucial for
the main results.
5The introduction of the real estate company is simply for the sake of modeling and
presentation conveniences and does not affect the essence of the model. In particular,
the real estate company does not need to exist by letting the sector 2 firms purchase the
factory buildings directly. This will lengthen the analysis, but same results are basically
obtained.
8struction workers and n2 ∈ N skilled workers.
6 When young, all consumers
supply labor and receive wage income. The construction worker and the
skilled worker work in sector 1 and 2 respectively. Deposit account and
equity purchase are two available saving channels in the economy. For
tractability, I assume that only the skilled worker can access the equity
market and labor supply is inelastic in both sectors.7
Let subscript i = 1, 2 refer to variables related to the construction worker
and to the skilled worker correspondingly. Both types have a life-time utility
function u(ci1t)+βu(ci2t+1), where ci1t, ci2t+1 ∈ ℜ+ represent the consump-
tion of a generation t consumer of the type i when young and old respectively,
β ∈ (0, 1] is an unobservable discount factor, and u(.) is concave.8 Young
consumers receive wage income wit ∈ ℜ+. Available saving options are to
save in banks −bit ∈ ℜ and the investment in equity sjt ∈ ℜ+ at the price
vjt ∈ ℜ+ where subscripts j = 1, 2, 3 are related to sector 1, sector 2 and
the real estate company.9 Designate djt+1 ∈ ℜ+ as the dividend per share
the investor will receive in the next period.
In each period, the sector 1 firm requires capital k1t ∈ ℜ+ and construc-
tion workers n1t+1 to produce new factory buildings y1t+1. The period t+1





6The word construction worker is chosen instead of unskilled worker since this agent
specializes in factory building production which no other type can do, though it is true
that in reality this type tends to have low education.
7For the first assumption about the accessibility of the equity market, One reasoning
might be due to low education background of the construction worker as observed in reality.
For the second assumption, labor integration across sectors might give more insight about
labor movement which is not the main focus of the chapter. It greatly increases the
complication to the extent that the model cannot be solved analytically.
8Unobservability of the discount factor is necessary in endogenising initial bubbles in
Section 5. Notably, this feature is still consistent with the competitive market framework.
The discount factor determines how many shares the shareholder would like to invest from
the profit-maximizing firms, but does not influence the production/investment decision of
the firm. Since the discount factor plays no role on the firm’s action, the competitive
equilibrium still applies.
9Note that bit is then the borrowing.
9α ∈ (0, 1). One unit of capital can be obtained by investing one unit of con-
sumption goods across a period. Assuming that capital is traded goods,
the price of capital in the context of small open economy and competitive
market is equal to one. Without loss of generality, capital is assumed to
fully depreciate each period.
In Sector 2, the production needs factory buildings xt ∈ ℜ+ as an addi-
tional input factor to produce consumption goods y2t+1. The period t + 1







where γ, ǫ, γ + ǫ ∈ (0, 1). For tractability, it is assumed that the sector 2
firm has to sign a contract with the real estate company to fix both rental
stock and the rent lt+1 ∈ ℜ+ one-period in advance.
10
Lastly, the real estate company invests in factory buildings to rent out
and then sell in the next period. This process is consistent with the lifespan
of consumers who are the owners of all the companies. The company signs
the contract with the sector 2 firm in period t to ensure the rent in period
t+ 1. Factory buildings depreciate at rate θ ∈ (0, 1].
Before analyzing the equilibrium in the next section, it is worthwhile to
describe the trade structure of the goods. There cannot be trade in factory
buildings due to the nature of the good and, in many countries such as
Thailand, by the law. However, the consumption goods can be traded. In
particular, the domestic and companies can trade their shares to the foreign
investors for the consumption goods. In the bubble event where the value
of factory investment is rising, more shares is expected to be issued and
the trade deficit and capital inflow are expected. Since the capital and
consumption goods are basically the same goods with one-period capital
10Note that this is not crucial assumption. This assumption together with labor market
segmentation is basically to free sector 2 from the bubble risk which complicates the
analysis.
10
operational lag, the capital is freely traded internationally at the price 1
with the implicit user cost equal to 1 + r∗.
1.3 Equilibrium
The macroeconomic activity in this economy is operated by infinite-lived
firms which are driven by the two-period-lived skilled workers as sharehold-
ers changing from generation to generation. To give a clear picture of the




u (c21t) + βu (c22t+1)
st. w2t = c21t + b2t +
∑3
j=1 vjtsjt
c22t+1 = − (1 + r
∗) b2t +
∑3
j=1 (djt+1 + vjt+1) sjt
The first-order condition implies the following no-arbitrage condition
between the returns of bond investment and other equity investments.




If the rate of return on equity investment is less than the world’s interest
rate, no one would invest in equity. Consequently, low level of productive
investment would raise the rate of return on equity. In equilibrium for both
deposit account and equity to co-exist, two rates of return must be equal.
Note that with the large investment from the rest of the world, the eq-
uity purchase by the local sjt is assumed to be small. This guarantees the
11Since only the skilled worker can become a shareholder, the constructive worker’s
maximization problem is not so crucial and is not presented here.
11
equivalence between the utility and profit maximization even in stochas-
tic settings. In other words, the risk-averse agent behaves as if they are
risk-neutral. For the deterministic model like this section’s, the use of this
assumption is not necessary. However, this makes the stochastic analysis in
the next section tractable by only focusing on the profit maximization of
firms.12
In short, the economy operates as follows. Sector 1 firms construct new
factory buildings in each period. Real estate companies then demand fac-
tory buildings from sector 1 firms and rent to sector 2 firms to produce
consumption goods.
In section 1, the firm invests in capital in period t. In the next period,
the firm hires constructive workers to work with capital to construct factory
buildings. To maximize the return of the shareholder of each generation, it is








1t+1 − (1 + r
∗) k1t − w1t+1n1t+1
As commonly known, the first-order conditions state that the competi-
tive firm pays the marginal product to each input factor.










In sector 2, the firm invests in capital in period t, and then hires skilled
12Obviously, one can assume the risk neutrality straight away. Here, the point is to show
that having risk aversion can also generate the same results as assuming risk neutrality.
12
workers and rents factory buildings in period t+ 1 to produce consumption









t − (1 + r
∗) k2t − w2t+1n2t+1 − lt+1xt
Here are optimal conditions.



















At last, the real estate company purchases factory buildings from sector




lt+1xt + pt+1 (1− θ)xt − (1 + r
∗) ptxt
The first-order condition results in the following no-arbitrage condition
between deposit account and factory investment returns. This condition can
also be interpreted as the zero-profit condition in the competitive market
environment.
13Note that a period-t budget constraint of the real estate company is (vt + dt)St−1 +
ptxt + (1 + r
∗)b3t−1 = (1− θ)ptxt−1 + ltxt−1 + vtSt + b3t where St is the total amount of
share issued in period t and b3t is the borrowing alternative of the company.
13
lt+1 + (1− θ) pt+1
pt
= 1 + r∗ (1.7)
To close the model, each labor market must clear (nit+1 = ni). Moreover,
the law of motion of the factory stock is provided below. At period t + 1,
the factory stock consists of depreciated factory buildings from the previous










Substituting constant labor supply in (1.3) determines the capital de-









Then, bubbles can influence the factory supply endogenously via capital
by (1.8). Similarly, the demand for capital of sector 2 is obtained from (1.4).




















Then, the rent can be written in term of factory buildings as follows.
The negative relationship between the rent and factory buildings is by the






















Substituting the demand for capital of sector 1 and the rent into the law
14
of motion (1.8) and the real estate company’s no-arbitrage condition (1.7)













































where Π = 1−γ−ǫ1−γ , Ψ =
α













The lower-bound condition in the system (1.10) implies that when the
expectation of the tomorrow’s factory price is negative, agents consider fac-
tory buildings useless and have zero value. Consequently, no new factory
would be produced thereafter.14
The system (1.10) demonstrates the rich interaction between today’s and
tomorrow’s levels of both factory price and stock. The supply of newly-built
factory buildings from sector 1 depends on tomorrow’s factory price. The
demand from the real estate company depends not only on the future price
in term of capital gain, but also on the factory stock itself in term of rent.
Given today’s price, if today’s factory stock is large, which translates into
the low rent, the tomorrow’s price has to be high for no-arbitrage condition
between bond and factory investment to hold.
Next, we define the equilibrium dynamics. Given an initial factory stock
x0, equilibrium is defined by sequences of non-negative factory price and











≤ g where pt+1xt+1
ptxt
is the (gross) growth rate of factory
purchase value. The condition, which the growth rate of equilibrium factory
purchase must remain below the growth rate of the world, guarantees that
the capital inflow from the rest of the world is always sufficient to sustain the
equilibrium factory purchase. Otherwise, there exists a generation that can-
not afford factory buildings in the future and hence that cannot be rational
expectation equilibrium.
Now, we define the fundamental equilibrium dynamics. Naturally, the
fundamental equilibrium dynamics are the equilibrium of which dynamics
converge to the steady state. Denote zt = (pt, xt), z¯ = (p¯, x¯), and define




+. Below, we define the fundamen-
tal price function from the fundamental equilibrium dynamics.
Definition 1.1 A function ρ(xt) where ρ : R++ → R++ is a fundamental
price function if for any zt ∈ R
2
++, (ρ(xt+1), xt+1) = φ(ρ (xt) , xt) and
limn→∞ φ
{n}(ρ (xt) , xt) = z¯.
15 
Standard definition of the fundamental value of an asset, see for example
Santos and Woodford [40], is the expected present value of the stream of its
dividends. The fundamental price defined in Definition 1.1 also conforms to
the standard definition. To apply this definition, the no-arbitrage condition

















Definition 1.1 states that the fundamental equilibrium dynamics are con-
15φ{n} means n-time iteration of the system φ.
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pt+k = 0, and
hence the fundamental price becomes the sum of the discounted stream of
dividends. The below proposition states the existence, uniqueness, and char-
acterization of the fundamental price function. Particularly, there exists the
unique fundamental price level at any given level of factory stock. Addition-
ally, the more factory stock is accumulated in the economy, the lower the
fundamental price becomes. Intuitively, when supply of factory buildings
rises, the price decreases to clear the market.
Proposition 1.1 For the system φ, there exists ρ(xt) which is unique,
continuous, strictly decreasing, and satisfying
limn→∞ φ
{n} (ρ (xT ) , xT ) = z¯. 
Proof Consider the system φ without boundary φˆ : Θ→ R2++ where



























The first step is to find eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the system. Lin-
earize the system φˆ at the positive steady state z¯ in (1.11).





























The characteristic equation is as follows.
∣∣∣Dφˆ(z¯)− λI∣∣∣ = λ2 − [(1 + r∗
1− θ
)




λ+ (1 + r∗) = 0
Define





















− (1− θ) +
ΠΩΨΓp¯Ψ−1
(1− θ)x¯Π+1
Eigenvalues λ and corresponding eigenvectors v of Dφˆ(z¯) are the follow-
ing.






























Quote 1.1 (The Centre Manifold Theorem) ”Consider the system of
differential equations z˚ = F (z), z ∈ Rm where F ∈ Cr and F (0) = 0. Let
Es,Eu, and Ec denote, respectively, the stable, unstable, and centre
eigenspaces of the matrix A = DF (0) (the Jacobian matrix evaluated at
z = 0). Then there exist Cr stable and unstable invariant manifolds W s
and W u tangent to Es and Eu at z = 0, and a Cr−1 centre invariant
manifold to Ec at z = 0. W s and W u are unique, but W c is not necessarily
so (If F ∈ C∞, then a Cr centre manifold exists for any finite r.). Similar
considerations can be developed for discrete-time dynamical systems (with
the general form zn+1 = G(zn)) characterized by diffeomorphisms (smooth,
18
invertible maps).16 In particular, there exists a centre manifold theorem
for diffeomorphisms entirely analogous to the Centre Manifold Theorem for
differential systems except that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at
equilibrium are split according to whether their moduli are greater, less
than, or equal to one. We can also define local stable and unstable
manifolds of a fixed point z¯ = G(z¯) of a diffeomorphism G, in terms of
their stability properties, as follows:
W sloc(z¯) =
{
z ∈ η| lim
n→∞




z ∈ η| lim
n→−∞
d[Gn(z), z¯] = 0 and G{n} (z) ∈ η ∀n ≤ 0
}
where η is a neighborhood of z¯, d[., .] is a metric, and
n ∈ {...,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, ...}.”, Lines [32]. 
In our case, since 0 < λ1 < 1 and λ2 > 1, E
s = v1. The mapping
φˆ defined on the positive domain is trivially smooth and invertible, so it
is diffeomorphism. According to Quote 1.1, there exists a locally stable
manifold W sloc(z¯) of the steady state z¯.
W sloc(z¯) =
{
z ∈ η| lim
n→∞
d[φˆn(z), z¯] = 0 and φˆ{n} (z) ∈ η ∀n ≥ 0
}
Quote 1.2 ”Consider the nonlinear dynamical system zt+1 = φ(zt). The
global stable manifold is obtained by the union of all backward iterations
under the map φ over the local stable manifold, and the global unstable
manifold is obtained by the union of all forward iterations under the map
φ over the local unstable manifold.”, Galor [15]. 








Figure 1.1: The fundamental price path
According to Quote 1.2, the global stable manifold of our system φˆ can
be obtained below.
































Note that since W sloc(z¯) is connected, so is W
s.
The last step is to prove that the stable manifold forms the strictly
decreasing function in xt. This can be done as follows. Quote 1.1 states
that W sloc(z¯) forms the curve tangent to E
s. Since Es is negative sloping in
the plane p − x, W sloc(z¯) is the curve in the neighborhood of z¯ where p is
decreasing in x. Moreover, for any two points z1, z2 ∈W
s(z¯) where p1 > p2
and x1 < x2, φˆ
−1
1 (z1) > φˆ
−1
1 (z2) and φˆ
−1
2 (z1) < φˆ
−1
2 (z2). Therefore, W
s(z¯)
20
generates a function ρ : R++ → R++ which is unique, continuous, and
strictly decreasing as depicted in Figure 1.1. 
The fundamental equilibrium dynamics always exist and are unique.
However, this may not be an only equilibrium of the economy. Bubbly
equilibrium dynamics are defined as the equilibrium that is different from
the fundamental equilibrium dynamics. Along their dynamics, bubbles are
embedded in the price of factory buildings. Formally, bubbles are defined
below.
Definition 1.2 A bubble is a difference between the actual price and the
fundamental price values of factory: (pt − ρ(xt))xt. 
The next proposition states the existence of such bubbly dynamics and
the sufficient condition for them. In words, since bubbles are growing, the
world’s resource must grow at the sufficiently high rate to sustain them.
Proposition 1.2 There exists a finite threshold gˆ ≥ 1 + r∗ such that if












gˆ = 1 + r∗. 
Proof From Proposition 1.1, we know that φ is a saddle. In particular,
any dynamic below(above) the stable manifold or the fundamental price
function will approach negative(positive) infinity. By definition, the
dynamics below the fundamental price function cannot be equilibrium due
to the violation of non-negativity constraint. However, the dynamics above
the fundamental price are the equilibrium if the world economy grows
faster than the growth rate of bubbly factory value. What follows is to
calculate the growth rate of bubbly factory value that can be generated
according to the system φ.
21
For initial condition where p0 > ρ(x0), we know from the proof of Propo-



































. Recall the stock dynamics from φ.































> (1 − θ), there exists a finite t˜





















≤ (1− θ), lim
t→∞
yt =∞ (1.14)





















































































Setting gˆ = limt→∞
pt+1xt+1
ptxt


































is positive and finite. 
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Proposition 1.2 is consistent with the condition required in the literature
for the existence of bubbles. In fact, our condition for the existence of
bubbles is even stronger. In the literature, the condition that g ≥ (1+ r∗) is
sufficient for bubbles to emerge. This condition can be met in the presence
of inefficient investment or the financial imperfection. In our case, higher
rate may be required. Hence, inefficient investment or financial imperfection
is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition. This is because we
analyze bubbles in assets with endogenous supply. Not only does the price
of factory grow, but the stock of factory also grows. This multiplies the
amount of fund required for sustaining bubbles. As a result, the sufficient
level of world’s growth rate might be raised.
According to the proof of Proposition 1.2, we can see that the required
growth rate gˆ is increasing in the productivity parameter α, while decreasing
in the depreciation rate θ. Intuitively, when α is high, the production of
factory buildings is efficient and bubble-induced supply of factory increases
at the higher rate. On the contrary, higher depreciation rate slows down the
growth rate of factory accumulation and hence that of bubbles.
Indeed, permanent bubbles in durable, productive assets such as real
estate and property are not easy to occur. They can only emerge only when
the world’s growth rate is sufficiently higher than the interest rate which, ac-
cording to the literature, can happen only when the world economy severely
suffers from the inefficient investment problem or financial imperfection.
Yet, once the condition in Proposition 1.2 is satisfied, the small open econ-




Before going into the analysis of the model, it is worthwhile to briefly
overview what is the meaning of sunspots. Sunspots are referred to as the
extrinsic random variables upon which agents coordinate their decisions. So
even in the absence of uncertainty over the fundamentals, the pure coordi-
nation of beliefs or expectation among agents on the market condition can
be the new source of the volatility of the real economy. Literally, the first
sunspots model is the work by Cass and Shell [6] outlining an overlapping-
generation exchange economy with fiat money. With the presence of sunspot
uncertainty and the restricted market participation, their model illustrates
the stationary sunspot equilibrium as a lottery over the certainty (determin-
istic) equilibria; for example, given the certainty equilibrium price qs, the
sunspot equilibrium prices can be constructed as ps = πsλsqs where πs and
λs are the sunspot probability and the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multipli-
ers of the sunspot state s = 1, 2, 3, ..., n. However, this is not always the case
as the subsequent works have shown that even in the case where there is a
unique certainty equilibrium (steady state), the stationary sunspot equilib-
rium and also the non-stationary sunspot equilibrium may be feasible. For
example, see Cass and Shell’s unpublished work (1975), Peck [37], Azariadis
and Guesnerie [1], Goenka and Shell [19]. The sunspot equilibrium then
has played an important role in explaining many applied economic prob-
lems such as business cycles and bank run, see Benhabib and Farmer [2],
Benhabib and Wen [3], Peck and Shell [38], and Ennis and Keister [12].
In the present model, bubbles without a crash are not realistic. Our task
in this section is to construct sunspot equilibrium where bubbles arise with
a probability to crash down upon the fundamental price ρ(x). Assume that
the economy follows a Markov process between two states: optimism and
25
pessimism. Being optimistic today, there is a fixed probability q to change
to the pessimism next period.17 It is assumed that the pessimism is realized
once-and-for-all. This once-and-for-all crash is crucial since this means that
the deterministic model can be used as the absorbing state when bubbles






Following the literature on the sunspot equilibrium, see Cass and Shell
[6], bubbles can continue to grow if the optimism is still realized. Once
the pessimism sets in, bubbles crash to the fundamental price level and
never emerge again. After the crash, the economy follows the fundamental
equilibrium dynamics converging to the steady state.
Given the Markov process and the fundamental price function from
Proposition 1.1, as long as agents are still confident and enjoying high cap-
ital gains financed by the foreign capital inflow, the economy can be off the
fundamental price path temporarily. In particular, the sunspot equilibrium
operates by means of the expected value between optimistic and pessimistic
states. The pessimistic state is referred to as the fundamental equilibrium
dynamics. When agents suddenly become pessimistic at time T , the factory
price sharply collapses to the fundamental price. Note that pt for t < T is the
bubbly price since only optimism is realized before the crash. By construc-
tion, the underlying price that would have been realized in the pessimism is
the fundamental price ρ (xt).
Now since the economy becomes stochastic, some micro-level optimal
conditions are now different from ones in previous section. For sector 1,
17The value of crash probability q may be determined by the belief of agents on the
expected duration of bubbles.
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the firm faces the stochastic next-period factory price in their investment
decision. Hence, the firm makes the two-step decision using backward in-
duction: firstly, given capital stock and the realized factory price, the firm
chooses the demand for workers in period t, and then invests capital in
period t with respect to that derived contingent labor demand. Working
backward, it firstly selects its next-period labor demands contingently given
arbitrary capital stock. Given k1t, the new labor demand is derived in the
same manner as in (1.2). Let subscript s = h, l denote variables associated














, pht+1 = pt+1, and plt+1 = ρ (xt+1).
Then, the capital investment is chosen optimally ex ante based on the
contingent labor demand. Using (1.16), the expected profit maximization











The expected profit becomes linear in capital investment. Due to perfect
competition, the first-order condition implies the zero-profit condition below.















Unlike sector 1, the firm in sector 2 still makes the one-step decision.
This is because the assumption on the pre-committed factory rental contract
makes the profit of the sector 2 firm unrelated to the factory price. Thereby,
all the optimal conditions of the sector 2 firm in the last section still hold.
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The last change is that the real estate company now maximizes expected
profit. Since the factory rental contract is assumed to be signed one period
in advance, the tomorrow’s rent is not contingent on the realization of the
future factory price. Thus, by the linearity of the objective function, the
similar no-arbitrage condition holds.
lt+1 + (1− θ)Et(pt+1)
pt
= 1 + r∗ (1.18)
Next, the conditional labor demand in (1.16) and the inelastic labor
supply determine wages in both states of the world which depends on to-
morrow’s realized factory price and today’s capital.

































For lt+1 in (1.18), due to the assumption that the sector 2 firm signs
rental contract with the real estate company one period earlier, sector 2
is free from the future price risk and hence the rent is still determined by
(1.9). Replacing capital demand (1.19) into the law of motion (1.8) and the
rent (1.9) into the no-arbitrage condition (1.18) derives the system below.

































Given x0 ∈ R++, the crash time period T , and p0 ≥ ρ(x0), sunspot









t=T which follow the fundamental equilibrium dynamics






≤ g. The last
condition states that agents expect the world to still eventually grow faster
than bubbles. If not, the dynamics are expected to be unaffordable and
cannot be a rational equilibrium. Kindly keep in mind that ϕ applies only
up to the period T −1, just before the crash. During these periods, only the
bubbly price in optimistic state is realized ex post.
Next, the next proposition characterizes the system ϕ, especially the
monotonicity of factory price and stock dynamics. This is of our interest
because bubbles are normally perceived as the increase of price over time.
We show that the dynamics of φ and ϕ are topologically equivalent: for the
initial price above the fundamental price, the price and factory dynamics
are eventually explosive.
Proposition 1.3 Under the system ϕ, given x0 ∈ R++ and p0 ≥ ρ(x0),
there exists a threshold function ρˆ(x) satisfying the following properties:
1. ρˆ(x) ≥ ρ(x) for all x ∈ R++.
2. ρˆ(x) is continuous, strictly decreasing over (0, x¯], and strictly increas-
ing over (x¯,∞).
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3. For any t ≤ T − 1, pt+1 > pt and xt+1 > xt if and only if pt > ρˆ(xt).
4. Given p0 > ρ(x0) and a sufficiently large T , there exists tˆ < T −1 with
ptˆ > ρˆ(xtˆ), pt+1 > pt, and xt+1 > xt for all tˆ ≤ t ≤ T − 1. 
Proof What we want to show is the threshold value of the
high-realization price p conditional on a given factory stock where the
high-realization price rises next period if the today’s price is set higher
than the threshold, and falls if the today’s price is set lower. If the price is
set higher than this threshold, the dynamics of ϕ would push the
high-realization price higher in every period. Moreover, if the price is
initially set lower than the threshold, the dynamics would pass the
threshold once and for all. So, we need to study the phase diagram of ϕ to
understand the directional field over the space and pinpoint the cut-off
value. To do this, some claims are needed.
Claim 1.1 The system ϕ and φˆ share the same global stable manifold
W s. 



















where Et(pt+1) = (1− q)pt+1 + qρ(xt+1).
Observe that this is of the similar form of φˆ by just replacing pt+1 by
Et(pt+1). Given pt and xt, one can use the dynamics of φˆ to get Et(pt+1)
and xt+1. Since the fundamental price function ρ(xt+1) has been determined
by Proposition 1.1, pt+1 can be recovered.
If we let p0 = ρ(x0), the dynamics of φˆ implies that Et(p1) = ρ(x1)
and p1 = ρ(x1) since ρ(x1) is derived from the global stable manifold of φˆ.
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where pt = ρ(xt) and limn→∞ ϕ
{n}(z0) = z¯ where z¯ is the steady state of φˆ
and hence also of ϕ. Since ρ(xt) is derived from W
s of φˆ, the same global
stable manifold applies for ϕ by definition. 
Claim 1.2 The system ϕ has a unique steady state which is z¯ of φˆ in
(1.11). 
Proof By definition, the steady state of one system must be on its global
stable manifold. By Claim 1.1, W s of φˆ is the global stable manifold of ϕ
and all points converge to z¯ of (1.11). Thus, it is unique. 
Claim 1.3 For p0 > ρ(x0), the dynamics of ϕ never crosses its global
stable manifold. 
Proof Given points z` = (pt, xt) with z´ = (ρ(xt), xt) where pt > ρ(xt) for
any t, since ∂ϕ1
∂pt
> 0 and ∂ϕ2
∂pt
> 0, ϕ1(z`) > ϕ1(z´) and ϕ2(z`) > ϕ2(z´). Since
ρ(x) is the price on the global stable manifold of ϕ by Claim 1.1 and ρ(x)
is strictly decreasing in x from Proposition 1.1, the next period higher
price and higher factory stock from the point z` than the next period price
and factory stock from the point z´ on the global stable manifold must lie
above the fundamental price. Hence, the claim is proved. 
Definition 1.3 For a given dynamic system (at+1, bt+1) = ω(at, bt),
• (a) ∆a+ωt = at+1 − at and ∆b
+
ωt = bt+1 − bt are defined as functions of
(at, bt).
• (b) ∆a−ωt = at − at−1 and ∆b
−
ωt = bt − bt−1 are defined as functions of
(at, bt).
18 
The notation in Definition 1.3 may cause confusion. Kindly note that




ωt informs the succeeding direction
18This is used in the proof of Proposition 1.3 below.
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of the point (at, bt) while ∆a
−
ωt informs the preceding direction of that same
point. In other words, ∆a−ωt is rather an inverse transformation of ∆a
+
ωt.
Claim 1.4 The dynamics of ϕ resemble the φˆ’s with a higher jump in p in
every iteration. 
Proof Since ϕ can be re-written in the form in (1.21), this replicates φˆ by
just replacing pt+1 with Et(pt+1). This means that given the same point
zt, (Et(pt+1), xt+1) obtained from ϕ is equal to φˆ(zt). Consequently, using
the dynamics of φˆ, for p0 > ρ(x0), Et(pt+1) > ρ(xt+1) for any t and hence
pt+1 > Et(pt+1) > φˆj1(zt). The claim results. 
Claim 1.5 There exists a global unstable manifold W u of φˆ forming a
strictly increasing price function of x over R++. 
Proof According to (1.12), the unstable eigenspace v2 has positive
gradient on the p− x plane. Quote 1.1 states that there exists a locally
unstable manifold W uloc tangent the unstable eigenspace. Quote 1.2 states







> 0, and ∂φˆ2
∂xt
> 0, the iteration preserves
the gradient of W uloc. Hence, the claim results. 
Claim 1.6 The dynamics of φˆ do not cross W s and W u. 
Proof The best way to prove this claim is by considering Figure 1.2



















This is the proof by contradiction. Suppose that the dynamics of φˆ move
a point z1, which is not on any manifold, to a point z2 across the manifold
for example across W u in Figure 1.2. Pick two arbitrary point z` and z´ on a
part of W s and W u, respectively, which bound the area where z1 is located,
see Figure 1.2. Draw an arbitrary line connected point z` and z´ in such a way
that z1 is on the interior of the line and this line do not cross any manifold
except at the end points. Denote this line as arc z`z´. Then, z2 must be on
φˆ(z`z´). Since φˆ is continuous and z`z´ is a connected set, φˆ(z`z´) is connected.
Consequently, as in Figure 1.2, there must exist at least an intersection z3
between the arc φˆ(z`z´) and a manifold. However, z3 comes from the interior
of z`z´. The existence of z3 contradicts the definition of the manifold whose
dynamics cannot be off the manifold forward and backward. 
To directly study the dynamics of ϕ, the difficulty lies on that we do
not have an explicit form of the fundamental price function ρ(x), so it is
not possible to derive ϕ−1 explicitly. Claim 1.4 gives an alternative way to
33
study the dynamics of ϕ via φˆ. Then, we firstly analyze φˆ as follows.



















































= 0, and ∆x−
φˆt
= 0 loci
together with W s and W u derived in Claim 1.5. The directional field is also
provided. Note that the dashed double-headed arrow of motion states the
direction of the previous move of the point while the dotted single-headed

































Figure 1.4: Full phase diagram of φˆ
Figure 1.3 is useful in analyzing the dynamics of φˆ. To understand how to
use this phase diagram, consider the following example in Figure 1.4 which
is the same phase diagram of Figure 1.3 without the stable and unstable
manifolds.
If the initial point is in Region A, the directional arrow in Region A states
that the next move has to be in the north-west direction. However, the next
move can only be in either Region A or Region B which has the dashed
double-headed arrow pointing in the north-west direction. As mentioned
before, the dash double-headed arrow addresses the direction from which the
point came; so, having it pointing into the north-west direction means that
any point in this region must have come from the south-east direction. If a
point in Region A jumps to Region C, this violates the preceding directional
arrow of Region C which indicates that any point in this region must be
from the south-west direction.
Claim 1.6 implies that for any initial point higher than W s both x’s and
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Figure 1.5: Dynamics of φˆ
Hence, from Claim 1.4, we can use the dynamics of φˆ in Figure 1.5 to
track down the dynamics of ϕ. This can be done by the following procedure.
Recall Claim 1.1 that the two systems share the same stable manifold which
is defined as the fundamental price ρ(x). As depicted in Figure 1.6, given
p0 > ρ(x0), the expectation E0(p1) follows the dynamics of φˆ. Next, recover
p1 from E0(p1) = qp1+(1− q)ρ(x1) which gives p1 > E0(p1) since E0(p1) >
ρ(x1), see Figure 1.6.
19 Then, given p1, repeat the procedure to find E1(p2)
and so on.
19Note that E0(p1) > p0 illustrated in Figure 1.6 is not general. As in Figure 1.5, there
exists a case where E0(p1) < p0 as well. The purpose of Figure 1.6 is only to demonstrate










Figure 1.6: Recovery procedure
Next, by Definition 1.3, below conditions are derived from the system ϕ.








+ q [ρ (xt+1)− pt]





























+ q [ρ (xt+1)− ρ´(xt)] (1.22)










Since ρ (xt) is strictly decreasing in xt by Proposition 1.1, higher xt re-
quires lower price in order to satisfy ∆p+t = 0. So, ρ´(xt) is strictly decreasing
in xt. Similarly, the ∆x
+




















Figure 1.7: ϕ with φˆ
low.20
















Now, compare the ∆p+
φˆt
= 0 and ∆x+
φˆt
= 0 loci with the ∆p+ϕt = 0 and
∆x+ϕt = 0 loci. It turns out that the ∆x
+
φˆt
= 0 locus coincides with the
∆x+ϕt = 0 locus while the ∆p
+
ϕt = 0 locus is an anti-clockwise pivot of the
∆p+
φˆt





ρ´(x) for x ∈ (0, x¯)
ρ`(x) for x ∈ [x¯,∞)
Clearly from Figure 1.7, ρˆ(x) satisfies property 1 and 2 of the proposi-
20This is used in the proof of Proposition 1.3. Note that, by inspection, ρ`(zt) is a convex
price function with a minimum. Since the intersection of the ∆p+ϕt = 0 and ∆x
+
ϕt = 0 loci
is the steady state z¯ by definition, Claim 1.2 implies that there is only one intersection.
Moreover, the alignment of all loci in Figure 1.7 including ρ`(xt) is the only possibility due
to the need of the suitable directional field for the global stable manifold.
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tion.21 By Claim 1.3 and Figure 1.7, the directional field implies that for a
point zt on the area where xt < x¯ and ρ(xt) < pt < ρˆ(xt), the next period
point zt+1 would be such that ρ(xt+1) < pt+1 < pt; while, for a point zt
on the area where xt > x¯ and ρ(xt) < pt < ρˆ(xt), the next period point
zt+1 would be such that xt+1 < xt. By Figure 1.7, for a point zt on the
area where pt > ρˆ(xt), the next period would be such that pt+1 > pt and
xt+1 > xt; moreover, Claim 1.4-1.6 imply that pt+1 > ρˆ(xt+1) Thereby,
property 3 in the proposition is proved. For property 4, Claim 1.3-1.6 to-
gether with Figure 1.3 and 1.7 imply that for any z0 where x0 ∈ R++ and
p0 > ρ(x0), the dynamics would eventually enter the zone p > ρˆ(x) once
and for all. In particular, for p0 > ρˆ(x0), tˆ = 0. For ρ(x0) < p0 < ρˆ(x0), if
the collapse does not occur earlier (T is large enough), 0 < ρˆ < T − 1. This
proves property 4. 
Proposition 1.3 addresses that the monotonic path in factory price and
stock is not guaranteed. The path that both factory price and stock are
rising can be obtained only with the sufficiently high initial price p0 > ρˆ(x0).
In such case, this model is consistent with bubbles normally observed in the
real world; for example, property boom in East Asian crisis.
The characterization of the system ϕ in Proposition 1.3 does not implies






≤ g may not hold. The next proposition
confirms that sunspot bubbly equilibrium exists in a small open economy
even in the case that the world economy has no growth.
Proposition 1.4 Provided that g ≥ 1, sunspot bubbly equilibrium
associated with p0 > ρ(x0) always exists. 
21Note that the directional field presented in Figure 1.7 is the one of ϕ directing
(pt+1, xt+1), not (E(pt+1), xt+1).
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= 1, so every sunspot
bubbly equilibrium for any p0 > ρ(x0) can always be sustained. In the
event that the crash occurs in finite time, the economy eventually reaches
the steady state and hence the growth rate is zero. Since bubbles in such
event are finite, the small open economy can absorb resource from the
world to finance bubbles before the crash. Hence, we only need to show
that in the event that bubbles never crash, the expected growth rate







To show this, note that for initial condition where p0 > ρ(x0), we know
from the proof of Proposition 1.3 that the following conditions are true







Recall the price dynamics from ϕ.
pt+1 =
(1 + r∗)pt
(1− q) (1− θ)
−
Ω











































. Recall the stock dynamics from φ.















































From (1.24), the dynamics in (1.26) imply the following.
lim
t→∞
yt > 0 (1.27)











































































































































] 1 + r∗
(1− q) (1− θ)
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= 0. The proposition is proved.







= 1 is conceptually a weak sufficient condition for
rational stochastic bubbles. That is, in the world without growth, even
though bubbles are expected to eventually stop growing, their value may be
expected to reach infinity. Then, it is unclear whether agents still expect the
world to possess enough resource to fuel bubbles and bubbles may not be
rational. Therefore, one may add a stronger condition which states that the
expected final value of bubbles must be finite: E0 (limt→∞ pt+1xt+1) < ∞.
However, this condition does not hold. To see this, consider the event
that bubbles never crash: limt→∞(1 − q)
t+1pt+1xt+1. Since the term (1 −












t → ∞, limt→∞(1 − q)
t+1pt+1xt+1 = ∞ and hence E0 (limt→∞ pt+1xt+1) =
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∞. As a result, readers should keep in mind in this particular case the
proposition is based on weakly-defined rational expectation equilibrium.







= 1 firmly guarantees that stochastic bubbles are ra-
tional. 
Proposition 1.4 implies that even in the case where there is no multiple
equilibrium- g < gˆ, sunspot bubbly equilibrium can still exist. This is
an unusual result which is different from what the literature on sunspot
equilibrium suggests. This fails to be valid in the closed economy where the
world’s resource is bounded and the interest rate is endogenous. In other
words, this result relies heavily on the small open economy assumption.
As stated in the proof, a small open economy allows agents to ignore the
possibility that domestic bubbles will use up the world’s resource in the
finite time. This leaves us to consider only the growth rate of bubbles in the
event that bubbles never crash. In expectation, no growth rate of the world
is required to finance bubbles. Hence, a small open economy is extremely
vulnerable to the emergence of stochastic bubbles. The belief that the world
is so large and bubbles will finally crash is sufficient for stochastic bubbles
to emerge.
Notably, the existence of this sunspot equilibrium is of the non-stationary
type. Hence, this result is still consistent with the established result by
Laitner [29] and Grandmont [18] which basically states that the stationary
sunspot equilibrium cannot exist in the saddle-point equilibrium dynamical
system roughly because with the exploding elements in the system (some
eigenvalues are greater than unity) the iterations of the (linearized) system
in some sunspot states inevitably diverse from the certainty steady state








Figure 1.8: Bubbly episode
Figure 1.8 illustrates sunspot bubbly equilibrium dynamics where p0 >
ρˆ(x0). In this case, both factory price and stock keep increasing until bubbles
burst. Optimistic agents expect the high price for the high capital gain and
the expectation is self-fulfilling. With the high price expectation, the sector
1 firm produces more factory buildings. However, bubbles are fragile. When
the pessimism occurs, the price collapses down to the fundamental level and
the economy stays on the fundamental path converging to the steady state.
In general, this model can create the temporarily-decreasing-price bubble
at the beginning of the bubble path.22 This is empirically consistent with
many bubble episodes such as Thailand’s economy in 1990s when the prices
of land and housing were actually quite stable until the sudden sharp crash
in 1997, see Radelet, Sachs, Cooper, and Bosworth [39]
Note that this does not complete the story of bubbles. Stochastic bub-
22In Weil [46], price-decreasing bubbles are possible if their existence affects the fun-
damentals of the asset. In particular, the bubble component of the asset may raise the
interest rate level and hence decrease the discounted stream of dividends or the funda-
mental value of the asset. However, the possible decreasing-price bubbles do not need this
dependency between the existence of bubbles and fundamental value.
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bles can emerge when p0 > ρ(x0). One may ask how this initial price is
selected. More importantly, if the economy was initially on the fundamental
equilibrium dynamics and there was a shock to the economy, the question
is what would happen to the economy. In principle, the shocked economy
would suffer an indeterminacy problem since there are multiple equilibriums
that can arise: fundamental equilibrium, bubbly equilibrium, and sunspot
bubbly equilibrium. The equilibrium selection is a purpose of the next sec-
tion. In particular, we use a separate argument to uniquely determine the
equilibrium for a shocked economy.
1.5 Endogenising initial bubbles
In this section, we provide a scenario that helps determine the equilibrium of
the shocked economy: fundamental equilibrium or sunspot bubbly equilib-
rium. We do not consider permanent bubbly equilibrium as an equilibrium
choice because of two reasons. First, permanent bubbles are not empirically
realistic. Second, if g ≥ gˆ, there cannot be a rule to select between bubbly
equilibrium and sunspot bubbly equilibrium: given same p0 > ρ(x0), both
equilibriums are both valid. Hence, we assume that agents always believe
that bubbles are fragile and might crash every period.
What would happen to the economy if the world’s interest rate suddenly
drops? Intuitively, if sector 1 is less capital-intensive than sector 2, a sudden
drop in world’s interest rate from r∗ to r∗n would benefit sector 2 more
which would lead to the excess demand for factory buildings. This leads
to an upward pressure on the price. The following lemma confirms this
conjecture. Denote subscript n associating variables or functions with the
new lower world’s interest rate r∗n.
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< 0, and for any xt ∈ [x¯, x¯n],
ρ(xt) < ρn(xt) 
Proof According to (1.11), . ∂p¯
∂r∗
< 0 and ∂x¯
∂r∗
< 0 when α(1− ε) < γ are
trivial. As in Figure 1.9, since ρn(x) is decreasing in x,
ρn(x¯) > p¯n > p¯ = ρ(x¯). Since ρ(x) is also decreasing, ρ(xt) < ρn(xt) for










Figure 1.9: Increase in the fundamental price
Specifically, there is a continuum of real estate companies of a unit mass,
i ∈ [0, 1]. Each company has a continuum of shareholders of a unit mass,
j ∈ [0, 1],with different preferences. Assuming the environment in Lemma
1.1 and the economy is at the steady state p¯ and x¯ initially. the following
scenario is proposed. The real estate company sells their share to raise the
fund for the factory building investment. It acquires factory buildings in
two lots: the first lot is the old depreciated stock (1 − θ)x¯ and the sec-
ond is the newly-built one θx¯. Suppose that at period 0, after spending
a part of the fund on the first lot at the price p¯, the world’s interest rate
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unexpectedly drops. According to Lemma 1.1, the fundamental price sud-
denly jumps up and the fund prepared for the second lot certainly becomes
inadequate; hence, additional borrowing is required.23 More importantly,
this also implies that the company implicitly receives an unexpected capital
gain from having purchased the first lot at the cheap price. The time line is
summarized in Figure 1.10.24
t=0 1
 purchase H1-ΘL x- at p-
 r* drops to r*n 
borrow more to purchase Θ x
-
at a new higher price
Figure 1.10: Time line
23Note that selling more shares against the interest rate shock is also possible. There is
still an asymmetric information problem since the share buyer faces ambiguity about the
dividend policy of the company ex ante; so, the below argument still goes through with
the buyer playing the bank’s role.
24Since the arrows in Figure 1.10 may be misleading, note that all the events in the
figure happen very closely to the period 0. Only the order of arrows, not the located
distance from period 0 and 1, matters.
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At the time of the interest rate shock, the company re-maximizes the
expected profit according to the new information set.
max
x˜
E0 {[l1 + (1− θ)p1] [(1− θ)x¯+ x˜]− (1 + r
∗)(1− θ)p¯x¯− (1 + r∗n)p0x˜}
where x˜ is the demand for the second-lot factory stock.
Choosing the new demand for the second lot, the below no-arbitrage
condition is of a familiar form, which means that the system ϕ is still applied.
l1 + (1− θ)E(p1)
p0
= 1 + r∗n (1.28)
To finance the purchase, the company proposes the borrowing plan to
the risk-neutral bank. The plan consists of two amounts of loan: the basic
loan L1 and the capital gain loan L2. The basic loan is the fill-up of the
inadequate fund from the equity sale while the capital gain loan is the extra
loan borrowed against the capital gain from the first-lot purchase. The
problem is that there is no commitment of how the company would use the
loan in the debt contract. In particular, the company can re-invest the loan
in the second-lot factory purchase or immediately pay the shareholders as
a dividend. The more each individual company re-invests, in aggregate the
higher the price and the capital gain can be achieved. This in turn influences
what amount the bank can lend in period 0. How much of the loan the real
estate company would pay as the dividend depends on the shareholders’
discount rate β which is assumed to be unobservable by the bank. Since
the bank has to lend before p0 is realized, it rationally plays a conservative
strategy by committing the loan at the new fundamental price. Since (1.28)
implies that the net expected return of factory investment is equal to the
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world’s interest rate and the fundamental price is the minimum possible
level of p0 which is consistent with the forward-looking principle, the bank
never has an expected loss using this conservative strategy.25 So, the bank
lends L1 = (ρn(x¯)− p¯)θx¯ and L2 = (ρn(x¯)− p¯)(1− θ)x¯.
Given L1 and L2, the real estate company optimally chooses a fraction
zi ∈ [0, 1] of L2 to pay as the dividend which would all be used for the
consumption.26 Since each real estate company has many shareholders with
different discount factors. For simplicity, let us assume that the company
dividend policy is decided from the average desired dividend of each share-
holder. Hence, this can be done by re-maximizing the expected utility of
the each shareholder subject to the consumer’s per-period budget constraint,
the second-lot budget constraint θp¯x¯+ L1 + (1− zi)L2 = p0x˜, and (1.28).
max
zi
E [u(c210) + βju(c221)]
st. c210 = zisˆ0L2 + c¯21
c221 = [(l1 + (1− θ) p1) ((1− θ) x¯+ x˜)− (1 + r
∗
n) (L1 + L2)]sˆ0 + res
θp¯x¯+ L1 + (1− zi)L2 = p0x˜
l1+(1−θ)E(p1)
p0
= 1 + r∗n
res = −(1 + r∗)b¯2 + v31s¯3 +
∑2
j=1(dj1 + vj1)s¯j
where sˆ0 is the percentage of the company’s equity the shareholder has
purchased, b¯2 is the old steady state borrowing of the skilled worker, v¯j is
the old steady state share price, s¯j is the old steady state share purchase,
c¯21 is the initial period-0 consumption of the young skilled worker at the old
25The concept of ambiguity is used instead of Bayesian inference. This is because this
lending is a one-shot decision and there is naturally no updating required, so the ambiguity
is straightforwardly introduced. In particular, this can be referred to the maximin utility
in the case of multiple priors is discussed in Gilboa and Schmeidler [16].
26Note that the fundamental price is the price that would prevail if none of the capital
gain loan were re-invested.
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steady state, dj1 is the dividend of period 1, and vj1 is the share price of
period 1, for j = 1, 2, 3 when 1, 2, and 3 are referred to the sector 1 firm,
the sector 2 firm, and the real estate company.27
Since sˆ0 is assumed to be small, the first-order condition can be written
as follows.








where E0(c221) = (1 + r
∗
n) [(1− θ)x¯p0− ziL2+ θp¯x¯]sˆ0+E0(res) by using the
second-lot budget constraint and (1.28).
As a result, the individual desired dividend zi(p0, βj) is determined im-
plicitly from (1.29) as a function of p0. Assuming that zi(p0, βj) is an interior







Intuitively, when the new price is high, the company obtains large capital
gain and the shareholder would receive large dividend in period 1. Hence,
the shareholder requests for the high dividend in period 0 to smooth his
consumption. The more impatient the shareholder is, the more immediate
dividend he requests.




zi(p0, βj)dj. Finally, with the market clearing condition∫
i










(ρn(x¯)− p¯)(1− θ)x¯ = p0θx¯
27c¯ = w¯2 − b¯2 −
∑3
j=1 v¯j s¯j where w¯2 is the old steady state wage of the skilled worker.
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Above implicit function determines the value of p0. Rearrange the ex-
pression in the following form.











Since ρn(x¯) > p¯ from Lemma 1.1, the second term of the right-hand
side is positive and thus p0 > ρn(x¯) results. The second term on the right-




zi(p0, βj)djdi = 1, every company pays full dividend; thus, the funda-
mental price appears. Since the discount factor βj is unobservable, the bank





zi(p0, βj)djdi = 1 and behaves conservatively




zi(p0, βj) < 1 and p0 > ρn(x¯) for some βj ∈ (0, 1].
Basically, the circumstance where the factory stock can be priced above
fundamental price is created. To be able to do this, the essence is to somehow
give the real estate company the extra resource to invest. The timing of the
unexpected interest rate shock serves this purpose. Asymmetric information
that the bank cannot observe the re-investment-dividend strategy of the
real estate company helps put that extra investment over the fundamental
investment level and provides the uniqueness of bubbles. When the bank
lends out at the fundamental price conservatively, if every company does
re-invest in factory buildings even a little, the rise in demand would push
up the price above the fundamental price.
Remark 1.1 The unexpected capital gain and the asymmetric
information problem on the re-investment-dividend strategy can put the
economy on the sunspot bubbly equilibrium. 
Proof As argued in the text. 
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1.6 Boom, crash, over-utilization and prolonged
recession
Consider an economy where α(1 − ε) < γ and initially is located at the
steady state z¯. At time 0, as elaborated in the previous section, the world’s
interest rate unexpectedly drops causing p0 > ρn(x¯). The interesting case is
where p0 > ρˆ(x0). In particular, this gives the before-crash factory price and
stock paths which are monotonically increasing over time. Assuming T is











Figure 1.11: Complete story of boom, crash, and recession
Before the crash, the optimistic belief in the high but risky capital gain
drives the economy with the miraculous growth rate. The massive factory
construction and significant capital gain result in the GDP boom.28
28Here real GDP is the sum of factory buildings and the consumption good produced in







where C is a set of all goods and Qct is the quantity of
good c produced in time t.
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In this case Et−1(pt) and xt−1 are increasing before the crash and so
is the real GDP. During this boom, the capital flows into the economy to
finance bubbles. Since bubbles are in the price of investment good (factory
buildings), bubbles crowd in investment. The high-realization factory price
gives the high rate of return on investment ex post and hence consumption
boom. Suddenly, bubbles collapse. Indeed, the crash of the factory price
reflects the phenomenon now commonly known as a Sudden Stop. According
to Mendoza [34], the Sudden Stop is characterized by the following stylized
features: the correction of the asset price, the reversal of international capital
flows, and the reduction in domestic production.
The correction of the asset price is trivial in the model. To see the rever-
sal of international capital, the sharp fall in factory price at time T causes a
dramatic decrease in the value of factory buildings. This causes great losses
to firms. The new foreign investment is based on the low fundamental value
of the firm, not the bubbly value as before the crash. The equity market
consequently crashes. Overall, this results in the abrupt capital outflow.
To see the reduction in domestic production, the after-crash real GDP












Actually, the period-T output from both sectors still increases from the last
period since the capital and factory stock is predetermined. However, the
significant fall in price would greatly affect the output of both sectors in
period T + 1 due to the reduction in the newly-built factory buildings.
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After the crash, the economy encounters a very deep recession. The over-
construction of factory buildings relative to the steady state level during the
before-crash period leads to the factory over-utilization and hence the very
low fundamental price appears.29 The sector 1 production has to be reduced
tremendously. Subsequently, the factory stock would be left depreciating
over time until the total stock is reduced to the steady state. These fac-
tory over-utilization and prolonged recession result from the sunspot boom
session that pushes the economy too far away from where it should have
been.
Therefore, the recession after the boom is not a mistake caused by any
concurrent policy. It is instead an emergence of the real health of the econ-
omy as the economy is finally on the fundamental path. This chapter implies
that the combination of the capital account liberalization and optimism in-
evitably leads to the bubble episode.
Note that in this particular case one can see that after the crash the
price is increasing while the factory stock is decreasing to the steady state.
Indeed, there are two contradicting effects to the real GDP. The first effect is
the price effect which values the factory more.30 The second one is the stock
effect which cuts down the sector 2 production. Nevertheless, the economy
would eventually reach the steady state where the real GDP is lower than
the level of the boom period. Figure 1.12 shows the time path of real GDP
corresponding to the economy in Figure 1.11. The two contradicting effects
result in the shaded area where the trend the path of real GDP after the
crash is ambiguous.
29Glaeser Gyourko and Saiz [17] also have the similar result but only in the irrational
bubble setting.
30Note that RGDPt is a function of price since the sector 1 firm invests in capital
regarding the next period price of factory buildings. Thus, the price effect is that, when







Figure 1.12: Real GDP
One good example which can be well-explained by this model is Thai-
land’s economic crisis. The severe Asian economic crisis in 1997 originated
from Thailand and had contagion effect throughout the region. In early
1990s, Thailand established the offshore banking center, and experienced
the continuous high growth rate and the boom in the property sector. Even
though many signs of the crisis have been pointed out afterwards, it was
almost totally unanticipated at that time.
According to the Thailand’s lesson, see Leightner [30, 31], some stylized
facts are observed. A speculative bubble in a property sector acts as a
catalyst. People invest in a bubbly asset because of the desire to obtain an
even higher capital gain. Price and a number of houses (factory buildings)
soar rapidly. This speculation is facilitated by the intensive capital inflow
from abroad in the aftermath of the capital account liberalization. Bubbles
suddenly end with the sharp collapse of the asset’s price due to pessimism
and widespread panic. As a result, the financial institutions face liquidity
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problem and this affects the real sector.31
Figure 1.13 shows the real growth rate of Thailand from 1993-2010 using
the four-period moving average of the growth rate of quarterly Thailand’s
GDP at 1988 price data.32. The growth rate is chosen here rather than the
level of real GDP to capture the growth aspect although it is omitted in
our framework. Consistently, the economy grows in the early years which
later are concluded as the bubble boom, and crashes in 1997 (the first big
downfall in Figure 1.13) After that the economy recovers and stays between
one- and two- percent growth rate which may be interpreted as the steady
state growth rate. This positive recovery implies that in the case of Thailand
the price effect dominates the stock effect.33







Figure 1.13: Thailand’s growth rate 1993-2010
31In this model, since all firms and companies are equity-financed, it is the shareholder
who encounters a loss from low realization of the price. Then, the low fundamental price
path affects the production of factory buildings after the crash. Note that the liquidity
problem is not explicitly modeled here.
32The data is provided by the bank of Thailand.
33Note that the second downfall in 2009 is unrelated to our framework since it is believed
to be due to the political shock.
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1.7 Welfare analysis
The aim of this section is to compare welfare of the bubble-followed-by-
crashed economy as in the case of Figure 1.11 to the same economy but
with the initial price starting at the fundamental level instead. In such a
complex dynamic context, tackling this welfare question is not easy. For
simplicity, this section compares the utilities of each type of consumers of
the same generation with and without bubbles. Moreover, the strategy is to
unrigorously fix the crash period T ex post and focus merely on after-crash
generations. Note that other generations’ comparison is ignored since it is
intuitively trivial that the utilities of all before-crash generations, being in
the boom period, are higher than ones without bubbles ex ante and ex post.
Moreover, the generation T − 1 whose investment is affected by the crash
should be the one who suffers the most ex post.
Under the optimal conditions, it can be shown that the value function of
utility of each consumer can be expressed as a function of wage income. This
can be shown as follows. Using the no-arbitrage condition (1.1), the first-
order condition of each consumer’s maximization problem can be written as
follows.
u′ (wit − savit) = β (1 + r
∗)u′ ((1 + r∗) savit)
where savit is the savings of a consumer of type i. As a result, the optimal
savings function s (wit) can be defined as a function of the wage income and
so can the value function V .
V (wit) = u (wit − sav (wit)) + βu ((1 + r
∗) sav (wit))
It is easy to see that ∂V (wit)
∂wit
> 0. Thus, it is sufficient to pay attention
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only on the wage income for this welfare purpose. According to (1.2)-(1.6),















Assuming the case in Figure 1.11, if the economy started at the fun-
damental price, the price would always be higher while the factory stock
would always be lower than steady state level z¯n = (p¯n, x¯n). In contrast, in
the after-crash bubble-followed-by-crash economy the price can soar highly
and crash to the level that is lower than p¯n while the factory stock firstly
grows beyond x¯n and then converges back. According to the above wage
formulas, this means the construction worker after the crash is worst off
while the skilled worker is actually still better off in the presence of bub-
bles.34 The reason is that the large amount of factory stock increases the
sector 2 production but reduces the value of the sector 1 output. In fact,
the only skilled worker that might bear the cost ex post is of the genera-
tion T − 1 since the value of his investment in factory stock greatly falls.35
Hence, the policymaker has to keep in mind that bubbles cause the wealth
redistribution across generations and consumers’ types.
34Note that the skilled worker is better off comparing to his wage if the bubble never
emerges; however, he is worse than one of the preceding generations since the factory stock
is moving back to the steady state.
35The skilled worker of the generation T − 1 is still better off ex ante since the wage is
the function of the level of the factory stock. However, with the bubble burst, the return
of the investment in the factory stock is greatly less than the world interest rate and may
cause the skilled worker worse off ex post.
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1.8 Conclusion
This chapter develops the model of bubbles in the price of durable investment
goods in a small open economy incorporating the common elements from the
observation of crises: optimism, price boom-bust episode, intense capital
gain, over-construction and over-utilization of factory buildings (relative to
the economy with no bubble), and severe recession. Permanent bubbles in
durable investment goods require the growth rate of the world to be higher
than a threshold which is at least equal to the world interest rate. This
can occur if the world is suffering from inefficient investment or financial
imperfection. This condition is stronger than normal condition required for
bubbles elaborated in the literature: the growth rate of the economy must
be at least equal to the interest rate which can occur if the world is suffering
from inefficient investment or financial imperfection. The reason is because
the supply of durable investment goods is endogenously influenced by bubbly
price itself. Thereby, the value of bubbles grows faster than the rate of
interest. In other words, inefficient investment or financial imperfection is a
necessary condition, but may not be sufficient condition for the existence of
permanent bubbles.
In contrast, stochastic bubbles can always emerge in a small open econ-
omy. Since bubbles are expected to crash to the fundamental price level,
bubbles are expected to be financially sustained by the large amount of in-
ternational savings from the rest of the world in the form of capital inflow.
Hence, stochastic bubbles can emerge even in the world with no growth.
This shows how vulnerable a small open economy can be against stochastic
bubbles.
When the initial price is once set too high, people hope for the large
capital gain. The factory price and stock eventually keep increasing. How-
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ever, the optimism is fragile. The boom ceases with a sharp crash. Finally,
the economy goes down to the fundamental price converging to the steady
state. Provided that the economy accumulates the factory stock more than
its steady state level during the boom, the after-crash return to the steady
state can be observed as long-lasting painful recession. This reveals the fact
that the recession is just the inevitable price to pay for the temporary boom.
One scenario to endogenise the initial price which sets the boom episode
is proposed. Together with an asymmetric information problem of a re-
investment-dividend policy, an unexpected capital gain due to the sudden
drop in the interest rate can drive up property price to be even higher and
lead the economy to the optimistic bubble path. In particular, this happens
when the company cannot commit how to spend the loan. This ambiguity
causes the bank to prepare for the worst where no money is re-invested in
factory buildings. Thus, when some is actually re-invested, the factory price
soars above the fundamental level uniquely.
Last but not least, bubbles redistribute the wealth across generations
and agents’ types: more specifically, from the construction worker to the
skilled worker.
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Chapter 2




In Chapter 1, bubbles in the price of durable investment goods in a small
open economy are characterized. However, one assumption is that all in-
vestment is financed through equity. The equity-financing fully allows the
investor to fully bear a risk of the investment. In other words, the invest-
ment decision can be made based on the total future income of the investor.
However, this feature fails to hold in the bond-financing which involves the
risk-shifting problem between creditors and debtors. Hence, the role of col-
lateral and the behavior of the credit market, especially the widespread
default in financial crises, are missing from the picture in the previous chap-
ter.
In the recent literature, there is an emphasis on the role of credit friction
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that can possibly generate many interesting economic outcomes. Krugman
[7], even though he explains in the context of the Asian currency crisis,
roughly but thoughtfully points out the importance of balance sheet effect
in which there is a two-way dependency between an ability of a firm to
borrow and the actual borrowing. In the incomplete credit market where
the debt contract cannot be written contingently, the risk-shifting problem
occurs. Instead, the creditor has to bear a risk of the risky investment, so the
liability is limited by the pledgeable income of the borrower. This protection
against the bad payoff may lead to the over-investment and resulting asset
price bubbles- see Challe and Ragot [3]. The interplay between the credit
constraint and the investment in the collateralized asset gives rise to the
feedback loop that magnifies effects of any perturbation on the economy- see
Kiyotaki and Moore [5]. This interaction mechanism may have a significant
impact on the existence and the dynamics of bubbles. Therefore, verifying
the robustness of the result on sunspot bubbly equilibrium in Chapter 1 in
the bond-financing format and finding a new insight are important tasks of
this chapter.
Precisely, investors in this chapter borrow from banks to invest in a risky
asset, i.e. factory buildings, which is an input for their production and a
part of their wealth. The simple debt contract where the only fixed interest
rate and the collateral are determined is introduced. Particularly, the only
asset that can be pledged as the collateral is factory buildings due to its
verifiability. Regarding the speculative type of bubbles considered in the
previous chapter, bubbles raises the value of the collateral and hence relaxes
the credit constraint further. This in turn helps support bubbles. In the
small open economy environment where abundant outside savings are ready
to flow in, the existence of stochastic bubbles still results as in Chapter 1.
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Moreover, bubbles induce banks to be more risk-taking. In the absence
of bubbles, the competition in credit market keeps the lending rate at the
cost of fund- the world’s interest rate- and the debt is fully secured by the
fundamental value of the collateral. Yet, when bubbles arise, the demand
for credit increases. The competition hence drives up the lending rate in
order to suit this excess demand. As a result, the debt obligation exceeds
the fundamental value of the collateral and the bank is willing to bear a
loss in the bad realization. If the bubble dynamics continue, the borrowing
eventually hits the bubbly value of the collateral and the credit constraint
binds thereafter.
The collateralized credit constraint and the dynamics of the credit mar-
ket are consistent with the reality. For example, when East Asian bubbles
crashed in late 1990s, many banks suffered great losses from the devaluation
of collateral and went bankrupt. Clearly, the effective credit limit was not
equal to the fundamental value of collateral but the bubbly one.
The last contribution of this chapter is on a new mechanism to initialize
bubbles. Apart from the previous chapter where the separate argument on
the moral hazard on the re-investment strategy causes the bank to lend
according to the fundamental value of factory buildings, the initial bubbles
can naturally emerge in the presence of the collateralized credit constraint.
Particularly, when the world’s interest rate unexpectedly drops, as in the
previous chapter, agents that have partly invested in factory buildings have
an extra capital gain at hand. As commonly known among agents, the more
fund to re-invest in factory buildings, the higher the factory price becomes
which in turn raises the credit limit and the capital gain further. Given that
every agent would behave in the same manner, one would re-invest as much
as possible, which is to borrow up to the credit limit. This strategic decision
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can push the price above the fundamental level and the dynamics of bubbles
begin.
Some literature on bubbles with credit friction deserves to be men-
tioned.36 Kocherlakota [6] shows that constraints on debt accumulation can
possibly cause bubbles. Under a wealth constraint, bubbles can exist if and
only if the asset is in zero net supply. Under a short sales constraint, bubbles
can exist if and only if some agent’s endowment grows at a rate larger than
the rate of return and the constraint binds that agent infinitely often: hence,
a short sales constraint prevents this bubble-affordable agent to decrease his
asset holding for consumption smoothing. Magill and Quinzii [8] conclude
that the prices of infinitely-lived assets in zero net supply permit speculative
bubbles and the existence of bubbles can affect the equilibrium allocation,
while the prices of assets in positive supply cannot have speculative bubbles.
This is due to an explicit bound on the debts or the transversality condition
limiting the asymptotic growth of the debts. Araujo, Pascoa, and Torres-
Martinez [1] exemplify the monetary equilibria with non-binding collateral
constraints which are bubbles due to collateral repossession or the incom-
plete market feature. In the former case, collateral repossession reduces the
supply of the asset so bubbles are not ruled out by the wealth constraint due
to the eventual zero net supply. In the latter case, the incomplete market
allows agents to have different personal deflators (multipliers) which gen-
erate room for bubbles to satisfy each individual transversality condition.
There is a shock over the endowment in each period and money helps trans-
fer wealth across the states of the world: the inner value of money comes
from this insurance feature. Lastly, Arce and Lopez-Salido [2] shows that
36Note that the literature mentioned here is not in the small open economy context and
hence bubbles are subject to the limited savings which differs from what we study in this
thesis.
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the credit constraint can result in the multiple bubbleless equilibriums with
different value of interest rate and asset price. When the credit-binding
equilibrium exists, bubbles possibly emerge. The reason is the following. At
the low interest rate the supply of savings can be high, due to the lower
debt obligation the saver earlier has. Since the credit constraint is binding,
the demand for loan is independent of the interest rate. Hence, the excess
supply for loan is available to afford bubbles.
The organization of the chapter is mostly analogous to Chapter 1. Sec-
tion 2 describes the setting. Section 3 discusses about the pledgeability of
income. Equilibrium is then characterized respectively in Section 4 and Sec-
tion 5 constructs sunspot equilibrium. Next, effects of bubbles on credit
market are presented in Section 6. Section 7 again endogenises initial bub-
bles and finally Section 8 is the conclusion.
2.2 Setup
Consider an overlapping generations model of a small open economy with
two-period-lived agents and the perfect international capital mobility. The
economy faces the fixed world’s interest rate r∗ ∈ R+ and all markets are
competitive. The world economy has no growth.37
There are two goods in this economy which are factory buildings and
composite-consumption goods. Factory buildings are the non-traded durable
intermediate goods; while consumption goods are the traded perishable final
goods. The price of consumption goods is set equal to 1 as the numeraire.
Denote pt ∈ R++ as the period-t price of factory buildings in term of con-
sumption goods.
37Since in this chapter we would like to focus on sunspot bubbly equilibrium, the zero
growth rate of the world allows us to study a fixed endowment economy which simplifies
the credit-constrained equilibrium system.
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Each generation is populated with contractors and producers with no
population growth. Denote N as the ratio between the populations of con-
tractors and producers. Each type is initially endowed with a constant
number of consumption goods W . As in a typical two-sector model, each
contractor and producer accesses to distinct technologies to construct factory
buildings and to produce consumption goods respectively. Available saving
channels are only through the deposit account and available production.
For simplicity, both types only consume when old, hence their objectives
are to maximize their old-period consumption. For the young contractor,
each can borrow b1t ∈ R to invest in capital kt ∈ R+. The capital is an
input for constructing new factory buildings in the next period through the
production function f(kt) = Ak
α
t . Without the loss of generality, the capital
fully depreciates in each period.
For the young producer, the decision is made between borrowing b2t ∈ R
and factory purchase xt ∈ R+. The factory building is an input to pro-
duce consumption goods in the next period through the production function
g (xt) = Bx
ε
t . Factory buildings depreciate at rate θ ∈ (0, 1).
Since both agents only consume when old, the zero young consumption
implies the following borrowing of the contractor and the producer respec-
tively.
b1t = kt −W (2.1)
b2t = ptxt −W (2.2)
Following Kiyotaki and Moore [5], a credit friction is introduced. In
particular, only income from factory buildings can be pledged. This is jus-
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tified because borrowers can intentionally misreport their income in order
to default. However, the durability and the immovability of factory build-
ings make this part of income verifiable. Therefore, to prevent the default
risk, factory buildings are required as collateral in the debt contract and the
credit is limited up to the future value of collateral.
The banking environment is the following. All banks are risk-neutral.
They can access to the international savings at the fixed cost r∗. The credit
market is incomplete and competitive. Therefore, the debt contract consists
of the lending rate (r1t+1 for the contractor and r2t+1 for the producer) and
the collateral, which provide the bank the expected zero profit.
The trade structure in this model is similar to the first chapter except the
bond which is issued instead of the equity. Thus, in the event of bubbles,
producers demand more loan for factory purchase hence more bonds are
issued. Consequently, the country experiences a larger trade deficit.
2.3 Pledgeability
The main difference between these two chapters lies on the way investment
is financed. In this chapter, the fund is intermediated via banks into capital
and factory purchase, while in the previous chapter it is via equity market.
The simple debt contract transfers the risk of investment on factory buildings
from investors to banks. That is, when bad payoff is realized, investors may
declare bankruptcy and simply default. Thus, the amount of loan that banks
would allow for investors must be at most equal to the discounted value of
future pledgeable income. This pledgeable income itself is the collateral in
the debt contract.
What is the pledgeable income of each agent? Recall that only future
income from factory buildings can be pledged in this economy. For the
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contractor, he invests in capital when young to construct factory buildings
when old. Since capital fully depreciates, factory buildings are the entire
future income of the contractor. Hence, the contractor has full pledgeability.
For the producer, he invests in factory buildings when young to produce
consumption goods when old and also sells the remaining factory stock.
Only his capital gain from the resale of factory buildings can be pledged, so
the producer in this economy has partial pledgeability. Precisely, the credit
constraints for the contractor and the producer are given below.
(1 + r1t+1)b1t ≤ pt+1Ak
α
t (2.3)
(1 + r2t+1)b2t ≤ (1− θ)pt+1xt (2.4)
where r1t+1 and r2t+1 are the individual lending rate which the bank charges
the contractor and the producer respectively.
In the case of full pledgeability, agents would not borrow up to the credit
limit. In other words, the credit constraint never binds. This is because
agents would not demand for loan which costs them more than the future
income they could ever achieve. If agents have partial pledgeability, the
credit constraint may bind since the loan can be used to generate the great
amount of their unpledgeable future income. The partial pledgeability of
the producer here is exogenously assumed simply for the sake of being more
realistic and general. However, this assumption is not particularly crucial
since the main implication of the model would still remains under the full
pledgeability of the producer.
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2.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the bank, the contractor, and the producer behave optimally
in the micro level. For the bank, since the credit market is competitive and
the economy is deterministic, the debt contract is the following.
r1t+1 = r2t+1 = r
∗ (2.5)
where (2.3) and (2.4) hold.
In words, the competition causes banks to lend at the lowest interest
rate, which is the cost of fund. The amount of loan cannot exceed the
discounted value of collateral because that is the maximum level the bank
can claim from the debtor. As a result, the bank has no profit and no default
risk. Note that both the contractor and the producer make their optimal
investment decision by taking (2.5) as given.
For the contractor, he optimally chooses how much capital to invest when
young given r1t+1 = r





t − (1 + r
∗) b1t
st. b1t = kt −W
(1 + r∗)b1t ≤ pt+1Ak
α
t
The first-order condition implies the following no-arbitrage condition
which the rate of return on capital investment is equal to the cost of fund.
pt+1αAk
α−1
t = 1 + r
∗ (2.6)
Intuitively, the contractor’s demand for capital depends on tomorrow’s
price of factory buildings: the higher factory price prevails next period,
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the greater profitability the contractor perceives and the more he invests in
factory buildings today.
For the producer, he optimally purchases factory buildings to produce
consumption goods. His maximization problem is the following.
max
xt
Bxεt + (1− θ) pt+1xt − (1 + r
∗) b2t
st. b1t = ptxt −W
(1 + r∗)b2t ≤ (1− θ)pt+1xt
The first-order condition also states the no-arbitrage condition between
the rate of return on investing in factory buildings and the rate of return on
saving account.
εBxε−1t + (1− θ) pt+1
pt
= 1 + r∗ (2.7)
So, how much investment in factory buildings relies on the rent- marginal
product of factory buildings- and the capital gain. If the overall rate of return
on saving in the bank is more (less) worthwhile, less (more) fund would be
invested in factory buildings which increases (decreases) the rent until the
rates of return on both alternative are the same.
Both no-arbitrage conditions (2.6) and (2.7) hold when credit constraints
are not binding. If credit constraints are binding, agents are unable to
arbitrage properly and the investment conditions would change. Since the
entire future income of the contractor is pledgeable, the young contractor
demand for loan is always lower than the credit limit and (2.3) never binds
as explained in the previous section.38 In contrast, the future income of the
producer is partially pledgeable. The young producer may demand more
loan than the value of his collateral, so (2.4) binds.
38To see this, using (2.1) and (2.6), (2.3) can be written as α(1+r∗)(kt−W ) ≤ (1+r
∗)kt
which always holds for α ∈ (0, 1].
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Therefore, the space p − x can be divided into the non-binding and
credit-binding region. Using (2.7), (2.2) can be re-written as follows.
(1 + r∗)b2t ≤ (1− θ)pt+1xt












This shows that for any xt ≥ xˆ, the credit constraint for the producer is
binding. Then, the young producer can only borrow up the limit to invest




+ (1− θ) pt+1
pt
= 1 + r∗ (2.9)
Next, according to (2.6), the law of motion of factory stock per producer
can be written below: tomorrow’s level of factory stock is the sum between
the depreciated existing factory stock and newly-built factory buildings,
which is determined by tomorrow’s factory price.










According to (2.7), (2.9), and (2.10), the equilibrium system is presented
below as a system of two first-order difference equations. For zt := (pt, xt),
denote zt+1 := φj(zt) as the equilibrium system where j = non, cb is re-
ferred to as the non-binding and credit-binding sub-systems respectively.






















where hnon(xt) = εBx
ε−1
t , hcb(xt) =
(1+r∗)W
xt






Note that φnon(zt) operates over xt ∈ (0, xˆ), while φcb(zt) does over
xt ∈ [xˆ,∞). Further, it can be shown that for an arbitrary parameter set,
the economy can only be one of the two types defined in Definition 2.1.39
Definition 2.1
1. Non-binding economy is an economy where x¯non < x¯cb < xˆ
2. Credit-binding economy is an economy where xˆ < x¯cb < x¯non.
40 
To prevent any confusion, Table 2.1 summarizes all possible regimes
involved in each economy.
Economy
Sub-system
for x ≤ xˆ
Sub-system




non-binding non cb z¯non
credit-binding non cb z¯cb
Table 2.1: Summary of economies, sub-systems, steady states
Now, we are in the position to formally define the equilibrium dynamics.
Given an initial factory stock x0, equilibrium is defined by sequences of non-




t=0 such that they satisfy
39Note that the economy is different from the sub-system and the region. For example,
the non-binding economy has both non-binding and credit-binding sub-systems operating
in different regions; however, since the valid steady state is in the non-binding region, it
is called the non-binding economy.
40The trivial case where xˆ = x¯cb = x¯non is ignored.
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the system φj and limt→∞
pt+1xt+1
ptxt
≤ 1. In the analogous fashion as in
Chapter 1, the fundamental price is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 A function ρ(x) where ρ : R++ → R++ is a fundamental
price function if for any xt ∈ R++, (ρ(xt+1), xt+1) = φj(ρ (xt) , xt) and
limn→∞ φ
{n}
j (ρ (xt) , xt) = z¯j where φ
{n}
j means n-time iteration of the
regime-switching φj .
41 
However, in the credit-constrained economy this definition does not im-
ply that the fundamental price is always equal to the discounted stream of














If the economy is always in non-binding region j = non, hnon(xt) =
εBxε−1t which is the rent- marginal product of factory buildings. Thus, the
fundamental price is equal to the discounted stream of rents. A simplest







+ . . .




and the fundamental price according to Definition
2.2 is no longer equal to the discounted stream of rents, but lower. This is
because when the credit constraint is binding, the producer cannot borrow
more to arbitrage properly and hence the rate of return of factory buildings
41For example, suppose that (pt, xt) is located in the regime non and then jumps into
the regime cb in the next period. Then the dynamics in the period t + 2 are determined
as follows: φ
{2}
j (pt, xt) = φcb(φnon(pt, xt)).
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An example of this undervalued fundamental price would be the steady



















+ . . .
This undervalued price does not mean that there are negative bubbles.
It simply means that the economy is credit-constrained, so the standard
fundamental price is suppressed and cannot reach the discounted stream of
dividends. This feature is also described in Challe and Ragot [3].
The below proposition states the existence and the characterization of
the fundamental price function. All feature of a fundamental price function
in the previous chapter are still maintained. Particularly, there exists the
unique fundamental value at any given level of factory stock. The more
factory stock is accumulated in the economy, the lower the fundamental
price becomes. Besides, the presence of credit constraint suppresses the
fundamental price - see Figure 2.1-2.2.42
Proposition 2.1 Given x0 ∈ R++ and φj , there exists a unique,
continuous, and strictly decreasing fundamental price function
ρ : R++ → R++ with,
• for non-binding economy, limn→∞ φ
{n}
j ((ρ (x0) , x0)) = z¯non.
42The solid line is the fundamental price function, while the dash line is the global stable
manifold of φnon. Since this stable manifold would define the fundamental price fund in
the case of full pledgeability of future income, this shows that the lack of pledgeability
reduces the fundamental price of factory buildings and hence GDP.
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• for credit-binding economy, limn→∞ φ
{n}
j ((ρ (x0) , x0)) = z¯cb.
In addition, this fundamental price level is at most as high as the one in
the absence of credit constraints. 
Proof See Appendix 
Proposition 2.1 is very informative. It details the factory price and stock
fundamental dynamics. Table 2.2 together with Figure 2.1-2.2 summarizes














Figure 2.2: ρ(x) of cb economy
Economy xT position Relevant sub-system p dynamics x dynamics
non-binding xT < x¯non < xˆ stay in non falling rising
x¯non < xT ≤ xˆ stay in non rising falling
xT > xˆ move from cb to non rising falling
credit-binding xT < xˆ move from non to cb falling rising
xˆ ≤ xT < x¯cb stay in cb falling rising
xT > x¯cb > xˆ stay in cb rising falling
Table 2.2: Summary of the fundamental equilibrium dynamics
Figure 2.1 and 2.2 also visualize the effect of the credit constraint on the
economy. Without the credit constraint, the fundamental price would be at
the dashed-line level. Intuitively, the credit constraint reduces the ability of
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the producer to finance factory purchase. In other words, he cannot afford
factory buildings at the proper price and consequently the less demand for
factory buildings decreases the factory price. Therefore, the credit constraint
suppresses the economy fundamentally as stated in Proposition 2.1.
In fact, the equilibrium of this economy is unique and it is the fundamen-
tal equilibrium dynamics. Too see this, the proof of Proposition 2.1 suggests
that φj has the same topological property as φ in Chapter 1. Hence, for any




≥ 1+ r∗.43 Since there is no growth in the world
economy, bubbly equilibrium dynamics cannot be sustained.
2.5 Sunspot Equilibrium
Again, we introduce the same Markov process as in Chapter 1 to construct







With the stochastic process, all micro-level optimal conditions are now
different from before. Let us start the analysis by discussing optimal behav-
ior of the bank. Denote r1t+1 and r2t+1 as type-specific lending rates for the
contractor and producer respectively. Regarding the debt contract, the bor-
rower repays the debt if the realized value of the pledgeable income exceeds
the debt obligation; otherwise, he defaults and loses the collateral. Given
this situation and the competition in the credit market, the risk-neutral
bank grants the loan b1t to the contractor at the interest rate r1t+1 which
43This can be proved in the same manner of Proposition 1.2 in Chapter 1.
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satisfies the following zero-expected-profit condition.
(1− q)(1 + r1t+1)b1t + qmin{(1 + r1t+1)b1t, ρ(xt+1)f(kt)}
b1t
= 1 + r∗ (2.11)
where (2.3) holds: (1 + r1t+1)b1t ≤ pt+1Ak
α
t .
To see how (2.11) determines r1t+1, let us consider the following argu-
ment. If the debt contract is written such that the fundamental value of the
collateral can cover the debt obligation, the debt is definitely repaid in both
states of the world. Since the credit market is competitive, the bank offers
the lowest possible lending rate which is the world’s interest rate. However,
if the debt contract is written such that the debt obligation exceeds the fun-
damental value of the collateral, the contractor defaults in the pessimistic
state and hence the bank has to bear a loss. Due to a high demand for loan,
all banks compete in lending while maintaining the same expected rate of
return 1+r∗. This can be done by raising the lending rate, so the bank gains
high return in the optimistic state in compensation to the loss from default
in the pessimistic state. The bank can raise the lending rate as long as the
debt obligation is still less than the bubbly value of collateral; otherwise, the
contractor would also default in the optimistic state. This is summarized
below.
r1t+1 = r










Similarly, the debt contract for the producer satisfies the following con-
dition.
(1− q)(1 + r2t+1)b2t + qmin{(1 + r2t+1)b2t, (1− θ)ρ(xt+1)xt}
b2t
= 1 + r∗
(2.13)
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where (2.4) holds: (1 + r2t+1)b2t ≤ (1− θ)pt+1xt.
So, the determination of lending rate is the following.
r2t+1 = r
∗, if (1 + r∗)b2t ≤ (1− θ)ρ(xt+1)xt
r2t+1 > r
∗, if (1− θ)ρ(xt+1)xt < (1 + r2t+1)b2t ≤ (1− θ)pt+1xt
(2.14)
Next, if the demand for loan is so high such that the debt obligation
cannot be fulfilled by the bubbly value of collateral, the credit constraint is
binding. In the case of the contractor, this does not happen. The reason is
that all his future income can be fully pledged as collateral, so he would not
borrow the amount that costs him more than his future income.44 However,
this is not the case for the producer. Due to partial pledgeability, the pro-
ducer may want to borrow more than the collateralized credit limit in order
to produce more non-pledgeable consumption goods. Thereby, the credit
constraint may bind.
(1 + r2t+1)b2t = (1− θ)pt+1xt (2.15)
For the contractor, he now maximizes his expected old consumption





t − (1 + r1t+1) b1t]
st. b1t = kt −W
(1 + r1t+1)b1t ≤ pt+1Ak
α
t
where according to the optimal debt contract Et [(1 + r1t+1) b1t] = (1 + r
∗) b1t.
44Using (2.1) and (2.16) below, (1+r1t+1)b1t ≤ Et(pt+1)Ak
α
t ⇒ α(1+r1t+1)(kt−W ) ≤
(1 + r1t+1)kt, hence always hold. Conjecturing that pt+1 ≥ Et(pt+1), (1 + r1t+1)b1t ≤
pt+1Ak
α
t . The conjecture is confirmed by Proposition 2.2.
83
The credit constraint for the contractor is insignificant and can be ig-
nored because with his full pledgeablility, the constraint would never bind.
Note that, as explained later, pt+1 in the credit constraint above is the
high-realization price.
The first-order condition implies that the contractor would invest in
capital until the expected rate of return is equal to the cost of fund.
Et(pt+1)αAk
α−1
t = 1 + r
∗ (2.16)
where Et(pt+1) = (1− q)pt+1 + qρ(xt).
Similarly, the producer chooses how much to invest in factory buildings





t + (1− θ) pt+1xt − (1 + r2t+1) b2t]
st. b2t = ptxt −W
(1 + r2t+1)b2t ≤ (1− θ)pt+1xt
where according to the optimal debt contract Et [(1 + r2t+1) b2t] = (1 + r
∗) b2t.
Now assume for a moment that the credit constraint is non-binding. The
first-order condition gives the following no-arbitrage condition.
εBxε−1t + (1− θ)Et(pt+1)
pt
= 1 + r∗ (2.17)
According to (2.16), the law of motion of factory stock can be written
below.
xt+1 = (1− θ)xt + Γ [Et(pt+1)]
Ψ (2.18)
If the credit constraint of the producer is binding, using (2.2), (2.13),
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= 1 + r∗ (2.19)
Denote zt+1 = ϕj(zt) where j = non, cb as the non-binding and credit-
binding bubbly equilibrium systems respectively. According to (2.16)-(2.18),





























where (2.12) and (2.14) hold.





























Given x0 ∈ R++, the crash time period T , and p0 ≥ ρ(x0), sunspot bub-









t=T which follow the fundamental equilibrium dynamics
given xT from ϕ
{T}






≤ 1. Next, the
following proposition characterizes the system ϕj in an analogous manner
as Proposition 1.3.
Proposition 2.2 Under the system ϕj , given x0 ∈ R++ and p0 ≥ ρ(x0),
there exists a threshold function ρˆ(x) satisfying the following properties:
1. ρˆ(x) ≥ ρ(x) for all x ∈ R++.
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2. ρˆ(x) is continuous, strictly decreasing over (0, x¯j ], and strictly increas-
ing over (x¯j ,∞).
3. For any t ≤ T − 1, pt+1 > pt and xt+1 > xt if and only if pt > ρˆ(xt).
4. Given p0 > ρ(x0) and a sufficiently large T , there exists tˆ < T −1 with
ptˆ > ρˆ(xtˆ), pt+1 > pt, and xt+1 > xt for all tˆ ≤ t ≤ T − 1. 
Proof This proof completely follows the proof of Proposition 1.3 by the
fact that ϕ in the last chapter and ϕnon and ϕcb in this chapter have
similar forms and hence all have the same topological properties. Here, we
prove only in the non-binding economy case since the credit-binding
economy case can be done in the similar manner.
To define ρˆ(x), we just need to construct a similar figure as Figure 1.7
but in the version of ϕj . Denote ρ´non(xt), ρ´cb(xt), ρ`non(xt), and ρ`cb(xt)
as price functions satisfying ∆p+ϕnont = 0, ∆p
+
ϕcbt
= 0, ∆x+ϕnont = 0, and
∆x+ϕcbt = 0 loci respectively. The topological properties of theses loci are
the same as ones corresponding to ϕ of Chapter 1. Now, to construct Figure
2.3- an analogous figure as Figure 1.7, two facts are required: (1) in the non-
binding economy case, p¯non < p¯cb and x¯non < x¯cb < xˆ, and (2) at x = xˆ,

























ρ´non(x) for x ∈ (0, x¯non)
ρ`non(x) for x ∈ [x¯non, xˆ)
ρ`cb(x) for x ∈ [xˆ,∞)
All properties in the proposition is straightforward from Figure 2.3 and
the directional field of ϕj . 
So far, we can see that all topological properties of the equilibrium system
of this chapter coincides with the previous chapter’s. Hence, our results are
robust in both equity- and bond-financing modeling. This also includes the
existence result of sunspot bubbly equilibrium. Intuitively, a small open
economy utilizes an abundant savings from the rest of the world to fuel
stochastic bubbles. Since bubbles are expected to crash, the resource of the
world is sufficient even when the world does not grow.
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Proposition 2.3 Sunspot bubbly equilibrium associated with p0 > ρ(x0)
always exists. 
Proof According to the calculation method shown in the proof of







= 1. Hence, sunspot bubbly equilibrium can always
be financed. 
Lastly, it is worthwhile to briefly highlight the role of credit constraints.
In this setup, the partial pledgeability is assumed. Yet, the existence of bub-
bles is essentially not caused by this assumption. Even with full pledgeabil-
ity, bubbles also exist. Therefore, binding or non-binding credit constraints
can only affect the dynamics of bubbles, but not the existence. However,
the binding credit constraint does suppress the fundamental price. Since
the producer cannot pledge the production of the consumption goods as
collateral, he cannot borrow as much to invest in factory purchase, so fac-
tory buildings become less valued. The partial pledgeability is studied here
because of three reasons. First, it realistically reflects the dynamics in credit
market. Second, it helps endogenise initial bubbles naturally. Finally, the
suggested policy becomes clear and simple. The last two points will be
evident in subsequent sections.
2.6 Credit market boom, binding credit-constraint,
and widespread default
The new insight that can only be extracted from the present model is the
dynamics of credit market. Consider the following lemmas.






Proof Given p0 = ρ(x0), ϕj implies that
(E0(p1), x1) = φj (z0) = (ρ(x1), x1) which means p1 = ρ(x1). Then given
pt = ρ(xt) for t < T − 1, pt+1 = ρ(xt+1), so the bubbly dynamics become
deterministic. 
Lemma 2.1 states that if the initial price of the economy is at the funda-
mental level, the sunspot bubbly equilibrium coincides with the fundamen-
tal equilibrium dynamics and the crash becomes meaningless. The economy
then always evolves on the fundamental price path.
Denote l1(x), l2(x), and l3(x) as the threshold price correspondences of
x that satisfy (1 + r∗)b1t = ρ(xt+1)Ak
α
t , (1 + r
∗)b2t = (1− θ)ρ(xt+1)xt, and
(1 + r2t+1)b2t = (1 − θ)pt+1xt. In words, l1(x) divides the space p − x into
the r1t+1 = r
∗ and the r1t+1 > r
∗ regions, l2(x) divides the space into the
r2t+1 = r
∗ and the r2t+1 > r
∗ regions, and l3(x) divides the space into the
non-binding and the credit-binding regions.
Lemma 2.2 l1(x) ≥ ρ(x) and l1(x) is strictly decreasing in x.
Proof When the fundamental price function is derived, the contractor
never borrows more than their pledgeable income which is ρ(xt+1)f(kt).
By construction, this implies l1(x) ≥ ρ(x). Next, from (2.1), l2(x) is
defined from the following condition.
(1 + r∗)b1t = ρ(xt+1)Ak
α
t
⇒ (1 + r∗)(kt −W ) = ρ(xt+1)Ak
α
t













= 1 + r∗.
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From (2.20), the increase in xt implies the increase in pt, hence l1(x) is
strictly decreasing in x. 
Lemma 2.3 l2(x) ≥ ρ(x) for all x ∈ (0, xˆ], and l2(xˆ) = ρ(xˆ).
Proof From (2.2), l2(x) is defined from the following condition.
(1 + r∗)b2t = (1− θ)ρ(xt+1)xt
⇒ (1 + r∗)(ptxt −W ) = (1− θ)ρ(xt+1)xt (2.21)




= 1 + r∗.
From (2.21), for any zt = (pt, xt), pt ≤ l2(xt) if and only if (1+r
∗)b2t+1 ≤
(1 − θ)ρ(xt+1)xt. According to the proof of Proposition 2.1, ρ(x) satisfies
(1+r∗)b1t+1 ≤ ρ(xt+1)Ak
α
t for all x ∈ (0, xˆ]; hence, l2(xt) ≥ ρ(x). Moreover,
since the credit constraint of the producer is binding from xˆ onwards, l2(xˆ) =
ρ(xˆ) simply by definition. 
Lemma 2.4 l1(x) and l2(x) are strictly decreasing in x.
Proof By inspection, (2.20) and (2.21) now straightforwardly implies that
l1(x) and l2(x) are strictly decreasing in x. 
Lemma 2.5 l3(x) = xˆ.
Proof From (2.2), (2.17), and (2.13), l3(x) can be defined as follows.
(1 + r2t+1)b2t = (1− θ)pt+1xt
⇒ (1 + r∗)b2t = (1− θ)Et(pt+1)xt




⇒ xt = xˆ
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The lemma is proved. 
According to Lemma 2.1-2.5, the area above the fundamental price path
can be divided into several regions. Figure 2.4-2.5 and Table 2.3 provide a




























Figure 2.5: Regions of cb economy
Region Operating sub-system r1t+1 r2t+1
A ϕnon = r
∗ = r∗
B ϕnon > r
∗ = r∗
C ϕnon = r
∗ > r∗
D ϕnon > r
∗ > r∗
E ϕcb = r
∗ > r∗
F ϕcb > r
∗ > r∗
Table 2.3: Summary of credit conditions in each region
Figure 2.4-2.5 and Table 2.3 break down ϕj in more details. There are
several regions with different operating sub-systems of ϕj . The variation of
these sub-systems stems from whether the credit constraint binds. Keep in
mind that our analysis is of the regime-switching type- a complex one. That
is, the main switch of the model is from the high-realization bubbly dynamics
to the fundamental equilibrium dynamics. Within those dynamics, each has
a switch between non-binding and credit-binding region. Moreover, within
those regions, there are separated into many areas with different conditions
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on lending rates.
Proposition 2.4 As bubbles grow sufficiently large, the bank starts to
take more default risk.
Proof Proposition 2.2 states that sunspot bubbly equilibrium dynamics
are eventually going out of region A toward infinity. According to
(2.11)-(2.14), Figure 2.4-2.5 and Table 2.3, the proposition is proved. 
Intuitively, when bubbles keep rising, factory production becomes more
profitable for the contractor while the producer needs more fund for factory
purchase. This results in the higher demand for loan to the extent that
the debt cannot be fully secured by the fundamental value of collateral.
Thereby, the competitive credit market encourages the bank to raise the
lending rate in order to lend more than the fundamental value of collateral
while maintaining the expected return at the cost of fund. Eventually, the
credit constraint binds which means the bank lends up to the bubbly value
of collateral.
Hence, when bubbles burst, everyone suffers. According to Proposition
2.4, the bank would encounter the default and attain the low-valued collat-
eral. Other than the loss of collateral, the contractor and the producer can
sell all remaining factory buildings only at the fundamental price which gives
them the much lower return than the risk-free saving rate. This is consistent
with what happens in the East Asian economic crisis in 1990s where many
financial institutions went bankrupt due to the widespread default and the
sharp devaluation of collateral. For example, 56 insolvent finance companies
and 1 commercial bank were closed in Thailand during the East Asian crisis.
Furthermore, according to the year-1999 report of Institute of International
Finance, the short-term commercial bank credit among Indonesia, Korea,
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Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand in 1997 decreased by $77.1 billion
from the 1996-level (a drop $15.8 billion in the case of non-bank private
credit).
2.7 Endogenising initial bubbles
As in the previous chapter, when there is a shock to the economy, the equi-
librium indeterminacy problem arises. In this section, we provide a new









Figure 2.6: Initial economy
Recall the similar scenario presented in Chapter 1. The economy is of
the credit-binding economy type and initially located at the credit-binding
steady state x¯cb > xˆ illustrated in Figure 2.6. The purchase of factory
buildings is proceeded in two lots: the first lot is the old depreciated stock
(1 − θ)x¯cb and the second is the newly-built one θx¯cb. Suppose that at
period −1, after the producer has purchased the first lot at the price p¯cb, the
93
world’s interest rate unexpectedly drops from r∗ to r∗n. Denote subscript n
associating variables or functions with the new lower world’s interest rate r∗n.
Since ∂xˆ
∂r∗
> 0, x−1 = x¯cb > xˆ > xˆn. As a result, the producer consequently
re-determines his demand for factory holding regarding the implicit capital
gain from purchasing the first lot at the cheaper price. The time line is
summarized in Figure 2.7 below.
t=-1 0
 purchase H1-ΘL x-cb at p
-
cb
 r* drops to r*n 
borrow more to purchase Θ x
-
cb at a new higher price
Figure 2.7: Time line
In the micro level, each producer has to re-consider his demand for fac-
tory holdings and the new borrowing denote as x´−1 and b´2−1 respectively.
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First, the bank offers the following optimal debt contract to the producer.
(1 + r2n0) (1− q)
[
(1 + r∗)b¯2−1 + (1 + r2n0)b´2−1
]
+qmin{(1 + r∗)b¯2−1 + (1 + r2n0)b´2−1, (1− θ)ρn(x0)x¯cb}





where (1 + r∗)b¯2−1 + (1 + r2n0)b´2−1 ≤ (1− θ)p0x¯cb.





st. b´2−1 = p−1x´−1 −W − (p−1 − p¯cb)(1− θ)x¯cb − b¯2−1
c220 = Bx´
ε
−1 + (1− θ)p0x´−1 − (1 + r
∗)b¯2−1 − (1 + r2n0)b´2−1
(1 + r∗)b¯2−1 + (1 + r
∗
n)b´2−1 ≤ (1− θ)p0x´−1
where b¯2−1 is the borrowing before the world’s interest rate shock and
E−1
[




= (1 + r∗n)(b¯2−1 + b´2−1) by the optimal
debt contract.
Given the sequence of price, the term (p−1 − p¯cb)(1 − θ)x¯cb is an extra
capital gain over the endowment W . However, this capital gain depends on
p−1. In other words, the level of price the producer expects to occur de-
termines the capital gain and hence the new borrowing-investment decision,
which in turn determines the level of price in the macro level.
The first order condition gives the following no-arbitrage condition.
εBx´ε−1−1 + (1− θ)E−1(p0)
p−1
= 1 + r∗n (2.23)
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Then, the question is whether this optimal borrowing violates the credit
constraint. Notice that the higher price p−1 the producer takes as given, the
higher capital gain he receives and the less credit-constrained he becomes.
For the later part of the analysis, we firstly conjecture that the producer
takes as given a sufficiently high price p−1 and hence a significant extra capi-
tal gain which makes the credit constraint non-binding. Then, all producers
and the bank play ”speculative borrowing game” which in turn determines
p−1.
45 For the argument to be consistent, we check that p−1 has to be
higher than p¯cb for the producer to have the capital gain from the first-lot
purchase. At last, we numerically show that this p−1 can create p0 which
sets up bubbles.
The speculative borrowing game is a two-stage game which the bank
and all producers take part in. At stage-1, the bank announces the credit
limit to the public. At stage-2, the producer decides how much he wants to
borrow.
Working backward, the first step is to analyze the decision in stage-2
given the credit limit. If the ‘optimal’ borrowing b´2−1 is still less than the
credit limit, there is an incentive for the producer to borrow and invest
more. The incentive is that if every producer borrows and invests more,
the demand for factory holding with the fixed supply then raises the price
p−1 up and increases the capital gain (p−1− p¯cb)(1− θ)x¯cb from the first-lot
purchase. As long as the no-arbitrage condition (2.23) which guarantees the
return of factory investment equal to 1 + r∗n holds, the producer is better
off. Note that only symmetric equilibrium can be Nash equilibrium. If only
one producer borrows and invests more, his action cannot affect the factory
45The uniqueness of p−1 depends on the selection of equilibrium definition. As will be
shown below, the game may have many Nash equilibriums, but the one we select is the
strong Nash equilibrium which is unique.
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price in the macro level and he then ends up bearing more cost. If only
one producer borrows and invests less than others, his marginal return on
factory investment is still greater than 1 + r∗n and it is not optimal. As a
result, every symmetric borrowing profile, which is less than or equal to the
credit limit, is Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.3 A strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which
no coalition, taking the actions of its complements as given, can
cooperatively deviate in a way that benefits all of its members. 
According to the above definition, the only strong Nash equilibrium in
the stage-2 game is when every producer borrows and invests at the credit
limit since this maximizes the capital gain from the first-lot purchase while
(2.23) still holds. Assuming a strong Nash equilibrium as an equilibrium
concept of this game, the equilibrium of this stage-2 game is where every
producer borrows and invests at the credit limit.
At stage-1, the bank expects the outcome from the stage-2 and set the
credit limit consistently. Remind that the credit limit (1 − θ)p0x´−1 is en-
dogenous. The following condition results from the fact that the producer
borrows at the credit limit and the bank sets the limit consistently.
(1 + r∗)b¯2−1 + (1 + r2n0)b´2−1 = (1− θ)p0x´−1





= (1− θ)E−1(p0)x´−1 (2.24)
where
b´2−1 = p−1x´−1 −W − (p−1 − p¯cb)(1− θ)x¯cb − b¯2−1. (2.25)
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Lastly, here is the factory market clearing condition.
x´−1 = x¯cb (2.26)
So, p−1 can be determined by solving (2.23)-(2.26).




(1− θ)(1 + r∗n)
(2.27)
From (2.18), (2.23), (2.26), and (2.27), p0 and x0 can be recovered. If
p0 > ρn(x0), Proposition 2.2 and 2.3 state that sunspot bubbly equilib-
rium emerges. A few notes are worth highlighting. First, for p−1 > p¯cb




. The required condition is x¯cb > xˆn which implies that
the binding credit constraint is crucial for this speculative borrowing game
to work. In fact, the bigger gap between x¯cb and xˆn means the higher
p−1 and the higher p0 which leads to the high chance bubbles can emerge.
Second, the less the fundamental price rises in respond to the drop in the
world’s interest rate, the higher chance p0 > ρn(x0). This means that the
economy that is sensitive to the bubble emergence is the one that the fac-
tory production marginally becomes more productive than the consumption
good production in the presence of the interest rate shock. This difference
in productivity is captured by setting α relatively higher than ε.
We conduct this numerical example to show the existence of the envi-
ronment where our speculative borrowing game successfully initializes ini-
tial bubbles. Therefore, one case is sufficient. Assume r∗ = 0.1, r∗n = 0.01,
A = B = 1, α = 0.5, ε = 0.3, θ = 0.1, N = 1, W = 0.01, and q = 0.1. The
outcome is presented below.46
46The algorithm for calculating fundamental price function is presented in Appendix.
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xˆ 1.6377×10−5 xˆn 1.2322×10
−5
x¯cb 0.5 x¯cb,n 0.6742
p¯cb 0.11 p¯cb,n 0.1362
p−1 0.6239 E−1(p0) 0.1587
x0 1.9769 ρn(x0) 0.0767
p0 0.1678
Table 2.4: Numerical results
One characteristic that is a result of our speculative-borrowing game is
an overshooting of the factory price in the shock period. As shown in Table
2.4, p−1 roughly increases tenfold from p¯cb and then decreases sharply to p0.
This is because the extra capital gain received from the interest rate shock
is entirely used in the re-investment of factory stock. Hence, the demand for
factory buildings in the shock period is abnormally high than other periods.
This jump in price is temporary but it is the beginning of the sunspot bubbly
equilibrium.
Remark 2.1 In the credit-binding environment, the unexpected capital
gain and the speculative borrowing game can put the economy on the
unique bubbly path. 
Proof As shown in the text. 
2.8 Conclusion
The existence of bubbles in a small open economy still holds within the
bond-financing framework. The important feature that supports bubbles
is the large amount of capital inflow available to fuel bubbles as optimism
continues.
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In the credit market, bubbles induce the more risk exposure to banks.
That is, high cost of factory purchase leads to the higher demand for loan
exceeding the fundamental value of pledgeable income. In the presence of the
excess demand for loan, the competition in credit market would encourage
banks to raise the lending rate in order to lend more at the cost of the default
when the bad payoff is realized. When bubbles crash, the devaluation of
factory buildings causes a great loss to both banks and borrowers.
The credit constraint does not play an important role in the existence
of bubbles since without the credit constraint (the full pledgeability case)
bubbles still can exist. However, it does suppress the fundamental of the
economy as it limits an ability of agents to afford factory buildings. More-
over, it can play an important role in endogenising initial bubbles via the
speculative-borrowing game which all agents borrow up the credit limit to
re-invest in factory buildings to maximize the unexpected capital gain from
the interest rate shock.
2.9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Consider the system φj : Θj → R
2
++ in the
text where Θj ∈ R
2
++ is a neighborhood of z¯j . Linearize φj at the positive





+ (1− θ) +






λj + 1 + r
∗ = 0





















+ (1− θ) +








− (1− θ) +





Eigenvalues λ and corresponding eigenvectors v are the following.


































Let Esj and E
u
j denote, respectively, the stable and unstable eigenspaces
of the associated Jacobian matrix. Since 0 < λj1 < 1 and λj2 > 1, E
s
j = vj1
and Esj = vj2. The mapping φj is trivially smooth and invertible, so it
is diffeomorphism. According to the Centre Manifold Theorem (see Lines
[9]), there exists a locally stable manifold W sloc(z¯j) and a locally unstable
manifolds W uloc(z¯j) around the steady state z¯j .
W sloc(z¯j) :=
{




j (z), z¯] = 0 and φ
{n}








j (z), z¯] = 0 and φ
−1{n}






























The Centre Manifold Theorem states that W sloc(z¯j) forms the curve tan-
gent to Esj . Since E
s
j is negative sloping in the plane p − x, W
s
loc(z¯j) is a
curve in Θj where p is decreasing in x.
According to Galor [4], the global stable manifold of φj can be obtained
below.
















Since W kloc(z¯j) where k = s, u is connected; hence, so is W
k
j . Note that
the iteration φ
{n}
j here is regime-switching such that, for example, φnon
switches to φcb when the dynamics move from the non-binding to credit-
binding region. Since every dynamic onW s(z¯j) converges to the valid steady
state z¯j , W
s(z¯j) indeed defines the fundamental price function ρ(x) by defi-
nition. The remaining task is to show thatW s(z¯j) form a strictly decreasing
function in x ∈ R++.
Since each individual sub-system φnon and φcb is a saddle, their direc-
tional fields are indeed topologically equivalent which can be recalled from
Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1. Using Figure 1.3,W s(z¯j) can be constructed graph-
ically by iterating W sloc(z¯j) backward in the actual directional field of the
regime-switching system φj . This actual directional field can be constructed
by overlapping the directional fields of sub-systems properly. Two technical
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facts are noted:
1. In addition to what is stated in the text, there can only be either
non-binding economy where z¯non is the valid steady state and x¯non <
x¯cb < xˆ and p¯non < p¯cb, or the credit-binding economy where z¯cb is the
valid steady state and xˆ < x¯cb < x¯non and p¯cb < p¯non.
2. At x = xˆ, both sub-systems φj coincide. This means that all the loci
in their directional fields also coincide.
Figure 2.8 shows how to overlap the directional fields of the two sub-
systems to obtain the actual directional field of φj in the case of non-binding
economy. Iterating W sloc(z¯non) backward provides W
s(z¯non) which is also











Dx+Φcb t = 0






It can be seen that W s(z¯non) can define the unique, continuous, and
strictly decreasing fundamental price function ρ : R++ → R++.
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In the case of credit-binding economy, ρ(x) can be derived in the similar
manner. 
Matlab code for fundamental price function
% Define a function for solving the fundamental path (rho) and save the
file named ‘diffeq’. This will be used in the main working code.
function diffeq=F(x,p)
rn=0.01; theta=0.1; A=1; alpha=0.5; W=0.01; N=1;
diffeq=((rn+theta)*p-(1+rn)*W/x)/((1-theta)
*(N*A*(alpha*A*(p-(W/x))/(1-theta))ˆ(alpha/(1-alpha))-theta*x));
% Now open the main file. Set the parameter value.
global rn theta A alpha W N r epsilon B q;
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According to Chapter 1 and 2, it has been proved that the vulnerability
against stochastic bubbles is the nature of a small open economy. In short,
an ability to absorb abundant savings in term of capital inflow from the
rest of the world allows optimism to set up bubbles. The main task of this
chapter is to find policy responses for such economy to handle the existence
of bubbles.
Bubbles are normally considered as an undesirable phenomenon by the
policymaker. However, the welfare analysis of our bubbles is greatly com-
plicated since the time of crash is not certain. There are obviously some
welfare gains from having bubbles ex post and ex ante. Ex post, there
are two sources of welfare gain: (1) the temporary high-realization rate of
return on savings which is trivially evident in both chapters, and (2) the
bubble-induced increase in wage during a boom in Chapter 1 due to an
over-construction of factory buildings which increases the marginal produc-
tivity of labor. Ex ante, there is always a welfare gain for the initial old that
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having their wealth evaluated at bubbly price p0 > ρ(x0).
The cost of bubbles is revealed ex post. The great loss is typically
on the crash generation where the value of factory buildings sharply drops
resulting in widespread default. In addition, the cost also comes from the
over-utilization of factory buildings, caused by the over-construction during
the boom, which leads the economy to stay at the low level of fundamental
price after the bubble crash. In Chapter 1, this implies the low marginal
productivity of construction worker and the low wage for the after-crash
generations.
However, the cost of bubbles in our models seems to be underestimated.
In literature and through history, the prominent cost comes from the melt-
down in financial sector within the crash period. The devaluation of the
price of collateralized factory buildings leads to the insolvency of banks.
Bank run instantaneously occurs and many financial institutes inevitably
shut down. The collapse of financial sector disables the financial intermedi-
ation within the economy. This dampens the fundamental price of factory
buildings and further hurt the economy more than what our models have
suggested. Hence, this chapter simply assumes that bubbles are undesirable
and tries to suggest possible policy responses to tackle the problem.47
Many related works have been extensively done, but how to handle bub-
bles is still controversial. There is the huge literature on the monetary
response against asset price bubbles. Even though our framework is not
monetary economy, it is worth mentioning. On one hand, Bernanke and
Gertler [3] provides the skeptical view that the monetary policy should only
respond to observed changes in asset prices to the extent that they signal
current or future changes in inflation or output gap. This is because bub-
47This can be justified by applying the Rawlsian welfare criterion.
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bles are hard to be identified and the intervention over misidentified bubbles
leads to weaker economic growth, asset price distortions, as well as the mis-
allocation of economic resources. On the other hand, Cecchetti Genberg and
Wadhwai [4] argue that raising interest rates modestly as asset prices rise
above the fundamental levels can reduce the effects of bubbles on inflation
and output gap, thereby enhancing macroeconomic stability.
Regarding rational bubbles, Kent and Lowe [8] point out that the poli-
cymaker can launch the tight monetary policy to influence the probability
of the bubble burst: when the interest rate is raised, the burden on debt
servicing increases and affects the optimism leading to the more fragility of
bubbles. In other words, the policymaker might prick bubbles early before
bubbles grow too large. However, Gruen Plumb and Stone [7] states that
the lag of policy measure to take effect would instead make the policymaker
prefer the expansionary to the contractionary monetary policy as bubbles
grow. Tightening the money policy results in greater probability of the bub-
ble burst which increases the growth rate of bubbles. Then, the severe loss
might occur next period in the event of the crash. Anticipating this, the
policymaker is discouraged to prick bubbles.
Aside from the concern on the monetary policy, the financial regulation
and supervision in order to prevent or mitigate bubbles are extensively of
economists’ interest. Mishkin [12] points out the importance of regulations
which prevent the financial accelerator. In particular, the financial acceler-
ator is the feedback loop between the balance sheet of corporations and the
credit provision- see Gertler [6], and Lowe and Rohling [9]. If the link be-
tween asset price bubbles and credit boom can be somehow cut, the effect of
bubbles on the economy becomes minimal. This is crucial especially within
the small open economy framework as there is the large amount of foreign
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savings ready to fuel domestic bubbles. The sole way to prevent bubbles is
to cut this credit channel as bubbles grow.
Based on the bond-financing economy like the one in Chapter 2, two
regulatory policies are proposed in this chapter. Inspired by the natural
credit limit proposed by Aiyagari [1], the first policy precisely aims to cut
the financial accelerator by controlling the degree of collateralization at the
level which the credit limit is at the fundamental value of collateral. This
can eliminate bubbles due to the following rationale. In Chapter 2, growing
bubbles induce the higher evaluation of collateral, meaning more credit pro-
vision, as well as more factory supply. When the degree of collateralization
is regulated as such, increasing factory stock drives down the fundamental
price level and hence lowers credit limit. Therefore, the reduced ability to
sustain bubbles can erase rational bubbles from existence.
The second policy is to impose the margin constraint. Following Men-
doza and Smith [11] and Mendoza [10], the margin constraint limits the
credit up to the fraction of the marked-to-market value of collateral. In
other words, this constraint requires borrowers to proportionally possess in-
ternal funding for their own investment. This margin constraint is normally
not derived from an optimal credit contract, except under special credit en-
vironments such as one with limited enforcement which prevents lenders to
collect more than a fraction of the value of collateral. However, rationalizing
the margin constraint is not the purpose of our analysis. Here, we assume
that the policymaker has an authority and enforceability to directly impose
the margin constraint on the financial sector as a policy tool against bubbles.
The potential rationale of using this constraint is also to cut the feedback
loop between bubbles and credit provision. When bubbles become large,
the internal funding that is required by the margin constraint increases. If
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the wage income during bubbles cannot rise at the sufficiently high rate,
bubbles cannot be afforded and ruled out from rational equilibrium.
Markedly, the analytical results show that both policies can eliminate
bubbles. However, the first policy is superior to the second since it does
not affect the fundamental price level of factory buildings. The exogenously
imposed margin constraint may further limit an ability to afford factory
buildings fundamentally and hence suppress the fundamental price. This is
precisely the reason we call the first policy as the first-best. However, the
first policy requires the regulator to have the complete knowledge on the
fundamental price function and also requires other agents to believe that
the regulator does so. Such deep common knowledge makes such policy
hard to implement in reality.
For the last contribution of the thesis, the role of speculative tax in
respond to bubbles in a small open economy is analyzed. An increase in
speculative tax in the presence of speculation and bubbles leads to the equi-
librium indeterminacy. Hence, the policy outcome is up to the coordination
of belief among agents. In the most likely case, the policy can stop the spec-
ulative activity but bubbles can still continue not through the speculation
but the long-term factory resale in the same manner as previous chapters.
This result shows that the speculation is distinct from the existence of bub-
bles. Next, the most desirable outcome is when agents coordinate at the
fundamental price and the fundamental equilibrium dynamics follow. How-
ever, it is also possible that the economy is on the new speculative bubbly
equilibrium. Even though it is less plausible on the economic ground to have
this coordination of belief, this is the worst case. Specifically, the specula-
tion still continues while bubbles appreciate more rapidly in compensation
to the higher cost of speculation. Overall, the policymaker has to keep in
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mind the double-bladed nature of the speculative tax policy- things can go
wrong.
All policies are presented in the following sequence. The first-best regula-
tory policy on degree of collateralization is analyzed in Section 2. Then, Sec-
tion 3 investigates the second-best policy on the margin constraint. Lastly,
Section 4 studies the effectiveness of speculative tax policy against bubbles
and Section 5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 First-best policy: degree of collateralization
Recall the entire setup of the last chapter. In this setup, both contractors
and producers borrow up against all their pledgeability income which is their
factory holdings. As bubbles grow, the value of pledgeable income rises and
the credit constraint is relaxed. This positive feedback loop between bubbles
and credit provision supports the existence of bubbles. If the policymaker
owns the full control of financial sector, the simplest way to cut this feedback
loop is to set the policy credit ceiling exogenously. This can definitely stop
the expanding pattern of credit provision and rule out bubbles. However,
this type of policy is devastating since it also hurts the fundamental of the
economy due to excessive control on credit provision .48 Thereby, it is a
challenge to search for a policy that can eliminate bubbles while keeping the
fundamental of the economy sound.
To serve this purpose, a control over a degree of collateralization is pro-
posed. The term ‘degree of collateralization’ is somewhat unconventional,
so the specific definition based on our framework is provided below.
Definition 3.1 A degree of collateralization is a fraction of pledgeable
48The interesting policy example of this type is the margin constraint which is investi-
gated in the subsequent section.
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income that is allowed to be used as collateral in the debt contract.
Hence, the concept of degree of collateralization should not be confused
with the degree of pledgeability. As discussed in the previous chapter,
pledgeability is naturally determined by the primitive friction of the econ-
omy. Then, the degree of collateralization is an exogenous restriction over
the primitive pledgeability. Here, it is assumed that the policymaker is
capable of controlling this degree of collateralization at will.
Denote λt+1 ∈ [0, 1] as a degree of collateralization. The modified debt
contracts for the contractor and the producer are given below.
The contractor debt contract:
(1− q)(1 + r1t+1)b1t + qmin{(1 + r1t+1)b1t, ρ(xt+1)f(kt)}
b1t
= 1 + r∗
where
(1 + r1t+1)b1t ≤ λt+1pt+1f(kt) (3.1)
The producer debt contract:
(1− q)(1 + r2t+1)b2t + qmin{(1 + r2t+1)b2t, (1− θ)ρ(xt+1)xt}
b2t
= 1 + r∗
where
(1 + r2t+1)b2t ≤ λt+1(1− θ)pt+1xt (3.2)
As proved in the proposition below, one possible first-best policy is for





This rule implies that the policymaker would always restrict the lending
volume as bubbles emerge. Even though bubbles may push up the market-
value of factory buildings, this rule reduces the amount of factory buildings
that can support the borrowing up only to the fundamental value of the
entire factory holding. The result from the previous chapter shows that the
dynamics of bubbles eventually lead to an increase in factory stock and bub-
bly price, but a decrease in the associated fundamental price level. Given
that the policy rule is a common knowledge, all agents realize that their abil-
ity to finance bubbles will be reduced over time and finally bubbles must
become unaffordable. Hence, the current generation would rationally not
purchase factory stock at the bubbly price since it could not be sold to the
future generation. Ultimately, bubbles cannot emerge. Note that techni-
cally the non-existence of bubbles under this policy can be precisely proved
only over the class of fundamentally credit-binding economy where x0 ≥ xˆ
and p0 > ρ (x0). This restriction reflects the fact that the abovementioned
mechanism of the policy to rule out bubbles relies on the credit-binding
characteristic of the economy.
An important remark on this policy rule is that it does not affect the
fundamental of the economy. This is because in the fundamental equilibrium
dynamics the factory price is at the fundamental price: pt+1 = ρ (xt+1). This
is the full degree of collateralization as in Chapter 2 which means the same
fundamental price function is derived.




can rule out bubbles without affecting the
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fundamental price function ρ (x).
Proof The first step is to show that ρ (x) remains unaffected by the
policy. To see this, pt+1 = ρ (xt+1) = pt+1 in the fundamental equilibrium
dynamics. Then, λt+1 =
min{pt+1,ρ(xt+1)}
pt+1
= 1 which is the case of full
collateralization analyzed in the text. Hence, the same ρ (xt+1) results.
The second step is to show that the policy can rule out bubbles. First,
suppose pt+1 < ρ (xt+1) so λt+1 = 1 which is equilibrium condition analyzed
in Chapter 2. Yet, we know that the non-existence of negative bubbles holds-
a contradiction.
Second, suppose pt+1 > ρ (xt+1) so λt+1 =
ρ(xt+1)
pt+1
< 1. Substituting this
into (3.1) and (3.2), the policy now imposes the credit limit up to only the
fundamental value of collateral. With this change, each l1(x) and l2(x) now
separates the space into non-binding and credit-binding regions regarding
the contractor’s and the producer’s debt contracts respectively.49 The new
space separation and all regional sub-systems are summarized in Figure 3.1-
























Figure 3.2: Regions of cb economy
Note that l1(x) and l2(x) that envelope region A are exactly the same
loci as in Chapter 2. However, their topological properties may not be the
same out of region A because the underlying sub-system in region G, H,
and I are now different from ones in the last chapter. However, I claim that












Table 3.1: Summary of each regional operating sub-system given the policy
l2(x) is still decreasing in x and in addition limx→0 l2(x) = ∞. To prove
this, condition of l2(x) that surrounds region G can be expressed as follows.
(1 + r∗)b2t = (1− θ)ρ(xt+1)xt
⇒ (1 + r∗)(ptxt −W ) = (1− θ)ρ(xt+1)xt






= (1− θ)ρ(xt+1) (3.3)










From above equations, the increase in xt leads to the decrease in kt
and the increase in xt+1; as a result, pt must increase. From (3.3), if xt
approaches zero, ρ(xt+1) will approach infinity and so does pt. This proves
the claim.
Since x0 ≥ xˆ and p0 > ρ (x0), the above claim implies that the relevant
































0 = x0 and p
′
0 = ρ(x0). Since z
′
0 is
50This is the credit-binding condition of the contractor.
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on the fundamental price path, its next point z′1 would be on the fundamental
path heading toward the steady state. Since p0 > p
′
0, the above sub-system
implies that p1 < p
′
1 and x1 < x
′
1. Since by Proposition 2.1, ρ(x) is strictly
decreasing in x, it must be that p1 < ρ(x1)- a contradiction.
For the region I, the operating sub-system is the following.
ρ(xt+1)
[
xt+1 − (1− θ)xt
N
]




















The sub-system implies the relation between xt and pt which in fact is
the frontier l2(x). Since any point on l2(x) also operates under the region
H which is incompatible with bubbles, this completes the proof. 
3.3 Second-best policy: margin constraint
The first-best policy recommended in the previous section is difficult to
implement since it requires the deep knowledge about the economy. The
policymaker needs to know the entire fundamental price function and, more
importantly, the public must know that the policymaker really does.
Alternatively, there are many possible ways to regulate the financial sec-
tor that would result in the non-existence of bubbles. What the policymaker
needs to do is to stop the credit flow that sustains the dynamics of bubbles.
For example, the constant credit limit would do the job. Yet, such arbitrary
credit constraint would impose a cost on the fundamental of the economy
as the ability to borrow is overall reduced.
One interesting credit constraint found in the literature and in reality is
the margin constraint. The margin constraint provides the credit only up to
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the fraction of the investment value. This also implies that the investor needs
the proportional internal funding to support his own investment. This main
characteristic of the margin constraint which differs from the collateralized
credit constraint used earlier is that it is a marked-to-market constraint.
That is, the current factory price is used to evaluate factory buildings in
the debt contract. Although this marked-to market constraint is not micro-
justified under normal financial environment, it is commonly applied in the
reality.
The margin constraint can potentially rule out bubbles according to the
following rationale. Bubbles cause the cost of factory purchase to increase
over time. This translates into more internal funding required for the invest-
ment in bubbles. The growth of the wage income may not be sufficient to
fulfill this funding. So, to investigate this issue, we present the setup which
endogenises wage income like in Chapter 1.
3.3.1 Setup
The setup is still about the contractor and the producer like in Chapter 2 ex-
cept the exogenous imposition of the margin constraint and the endogenous
wage dynamics.51 There is no population growth and the ratio between these
two types of agents is fixed equal to N . The economy faces the fixed world’s
interest rate r∗ ∈ R+ and all markets are competitive. There are two goods
in this economy which are factory buildings and composite-consumption
goods. Factory buildings are the non-traded durable intermediate goods;
51Adding the wage dynamics into this setup may make the comparison with the first-
best policy unclear; however, there is a good reason for this. Having the fixed endowment
economy in the presence of margin constraint would straightforwardly rule out the pos-
sibility of bubbles since the credit limit would be exogenously constant; hence, it is not
interesting. The interesting question is when there is an endogenous wage which would
increase in the event of bubbles. As a result, the margin constraint would be relaxed and
bubbles could still emerge. So, to check this possibility, it is necessary to add this wage
dimension into the framework.
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while consumption goods are the traded perishable final goods. Available
saving channels are only through the deposit account and productions. Each
agent maximizes his consumption when old.
The new production process is given as follows. Firstly, to construct
factory buildings, the old contractor requires both capital kt ∈ R+ and con-
struction worker (young contractor) n1t+1 ∈ R+ via the production function
f(kt, n1t+1): f1 > 0, f2 > 0, f11 < 0, and f22 < 0. The young contrac-
tor hence earns wage income w1t. Without the loss of generality, the capital
fully depreciates. Secondly, to produce consumption goods, the old producer
requires both factory buildings xt ∈ R+ and skilled worker (young producer)
n2t+1 ∈ R+ via the production function g(xt, n2t+1): g1 > 0, g2 > 0, g11 < 0,
g22 < 0, limxt→0 g1 = ∞, limxt→∞ g1 = 0, xtg1(xt, n2t+1) = εg(xt, n2t+1),
and n2t+1g2(xt, n2t+1) = γg(xt, n2t+1) where ε ∈ (0, 1) and γ is constant.
52
The young producer then receives wage income w2t. Factory buildings de-
preciate at the rate θ ∈ (0, 1). As stated, the labor market is segmented.
Each type is assumed to have complete specialization in each sector and the
labor movement across sectors is not possible.
The banking environment is as in Chapter 2. All banks are risk-neutral
which access to the international savings at the fixed cost r∗. Importantly,
the policymaker imposes the simple margin constraint on the factory invest-
ment.53
b2t ≤ κptxt
where κ is a constant.
52Again, the Cobb-Douglas function satisfies all qualifications above.
53For simplicity, the margin constraint is imposed only on the producer. This is enough
for our purpose since imposition on both sectors would only make the credit channel more
restrictive and become harder for bubbles to emerge.
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3.3.2 Equilibrium
The competition in credit market drives the effective lending rate down to
the cost of fund r∗. In the micro level, each agent maximizes his own objec-
tive function given all prices and constraints. For the young contractor, he
optimally selects the borrowing, the capital investment, and the labor de-
mand for factory production to maximize his old consumption given wages,
factory prices, and his lending rate.
max
kt,n1t+1,b1t
pt+1f(kt, n1t+1)− w1t+1n1t+1 − (1 + r
∗) b1t
st. b1t = kt − w1t
The first-order conditions imply that the inputs of production earn their
marginal products.
pt+1f1(kt, n1t+1) = 1 + r
∗
pt+1f2(kt, n1t+1) = w1t+1
For the young producer, he optimally chooses the borrowing, the factory
investment, and the labor demand for consumption good production given
wages, factory prices, and his lending rate. Additionally, his borrowing
decision is subject to the margin constraint.
max
xt,n2t+1,b2t
g(xt, n2t+1) + (1− θ)pt+1xt − w2t+1n2t+1 − (1 + r
∗) b2t
st. b2t = ptxt − w2t
b2t ≤ κptxt
When the margin constraint is not binding, the required internal funding
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is less than the wage income.
(1− κ)ptxt < w2t
According to the first-order conditions, the rate of return on factory
investment must be equal to the cost of fund; while, the labor must earn its
marginal product.
g1(xt, n2t+1) + (1− θ)pt+1
pt
= 1 + r∗ (3.4)
g2(xt, n2t+1) = w2t+1 (3.5)
In the macro level, since the population growth is zero, the number of
employers is equal to the number of employees. Thereby, the following labor
market-clearing condition is as follows.
n1t+1 = n2t+1 = 1
Lastly, the law of motion of factory buildings is the following.








where f(kt) = f(kt, 1) and f
′(kt) = f1(kt, 1).
























where g(xt) = g(xt, 1), and g
′(xt) = g1(xt, 1).
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Since the above system is exactly the one analyzed in Chapter 2, φnon is
a saddle and the stable manifold forms the strictly decreasing price function
over factory stock.
Now, assume that the margin constraint is binding.
b2t = κptxt
Then, the zero consumption when young gives the new condition which
replaces the no-arbitrage condition (3.4).
(1− κ)ptxt = w2t
Substituting w2t from (3.5) into above condition, the credit-binding con-
dition results.
(1− κ)ptxt = g2(xt−1, 1) = γg(xt−1) (3.7)
Using (3.6), the credit-frontier function ρ˜(xt) can be implicitly defined
below.












where pt = ρ˜(xt).
The above credit-frontier function separates the space p − x into the
non-binding and credit-binding regions. The following lemma characterizes








Figure 3.3: Credit-frontier function
Lemma 3.1 The credit-frontier function ρ˜(x) is a single-peaked price
function ρ˜ : R+ → R+ where ρ˜(0) = 0 and limx→∞ ρ˜(x) = 0 as depicted in
Figure 3.3. Further, for any z = (p, x) where p > ρ˜(x), the margin
constraint is binding and vice versa.
Proof Regarding (3.8), fix p = 0. Then graph LHS and RHS as a
function of x. Find the intersection and then increase p by small amount
ǫ > 0. See the figure below.
RHS : p = 0
RHS : p = Ε
LHS : p = 0
LHS : p = Ε
x
Figure 3.4: Derivation
RHS : p = p




Then ρ˜(0) = 0 and, given p = 0, LHS < RHS for x > 0. When price
increases, RHS falls and LHS rises for all x. Note that for given p = ǫ > 0,
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there are always two intersections. This is due to limxt→∞ g1 = 0. If we
keep increasing the price, there must exist a unique p˜ that RHS tangents
LHS at x˜ which implies the maximum of ρ˜(x). Consequently, Figure 3.3
results.
Finally, for z = (p, x) where p > ρ˜(x), (3.8) straightforwardly implies
the violation of margin constraint.











⇒ b2t > κpx
Thus, the lemma is proved. 
The credit-frontier locus divides the space into non-binding region where
φnon operates and credit-binding region where the credit-binding system
does. The credit-binding system below is derived from (3.6) and (3.7), where
z¯cb is the associated steady state.
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where the price dynamics can be recovered from (3.8).
As stated, φnon is a saddle with the stable manifold forming the strictly
decreasing function in factory stock. For credit-binding system, (3.8) implies
that any point above the credit-frontier locus is not feasible and the equi-
librium dynamics are restricted on the credit-frontier locus. The dynamical
feature of credit-binding system is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 z¯cb, is the globally stable steady state where the dynamics of
all point z = (ρ˜(x), x) converge to in the non-oscillatory manner along the
credit frontier. 
54Note that these conditions also derive the credit frontier.
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Proof Linearize (3.9) around z¯cb. The characteristic root η can be solved
as follows.
η =






The assumption that ε ∈ (0, 1) implies that η ∈ (0, 1). So, there exists
the local stable manifold. Since dxt
dxt+1
> 0, the backward iteration method
previously used in the proofs of Proposition 1.1 and 2.1 suggests that z¯cb
is hence globally stable and the dynamics of the credit-binding system are







Figure 3.6: Dynamics over credit frontier
This completes the proof. 
Without margin constraint, φnon would have operated on the entire
space. In the presence of margin constraint, any point above the credit-
frontier locus cannot be achieved and the dynamics follow the credit-binding
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system (3.9). Combining the stable manifold of φnon and the one of credit-
binding system, derived in Lemma 3.2, gives the restricted fundamental
price function and its dynamics. Below figure shows one possible example.
Recall that W snon is the stable manifold of φnon which should have been the
entire fundamental price function. However, some parts of it may fall into
the credit-binding region and instead are restricted to the dynamics on the
credit frontier. As a result, the suppressed fundamental price function is









Figure 3.7: Suppressed fundamental price
Remark 3.1 The margin constraint suppresses the fundamental of the
economy. 
Proof This is direct results from Figure 3.7 where some parts of the
stable manifold of φnon must lie in the credit-binding region and become
invalid. 
The single-peaked shape of the credit-frontier locus by Lemma 3.1 is a





Figure 3.8: Non-existence of bubbles
sufficient appreciation in every period to provide the same expected rate of
return as other saving alternatives’. However, the credit frontier becomes
an upper bound limiting all the possible bubble paths for any given initial
condition as illustrated in Figure 3.8.
Intuitively, the margin constraint requires the producer to proportionally
put their own wealth on the factory investment. If bubbles exist, the growth
of bubbles increases the investment value and hence demands more personal
wealth to support the factory purchase. Indeed, the wealth of the producer
(the wage income w2t) is rising along with bubbles since bubbles induce more
supply of factory buildings and labor becomes more productive. However,
the concavity of production function (the assumption on ε ∈ (0, 1)) makes
the wage income increase at the decreasing rate which cannot catch up with
the bubble appreciation. Consequently, bubbles cannot be sustained and
rational agents would not buy them to begin with. Bubbles cannot emerge.
Proposition 3.2 The margin constraint can rule out bubbles. 
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Proof As argued in the text. 
3.4 Speculation and tax imposition
Tax imposition on asset acquisition is one of the most commonly suggested
policies against bubbles. Challe and Ragot [5] show that the combination
between Tobin Tax and an alternative asset backing schemecan disincentive
the investment in housing bubbles in their model, though the other pure
bubbly equilibrium is supported instead.55 Allen and Rogoff [2] also recom-
mend that the policymaker should increase taxes on the real estate transfer
to alleviate the bubble situation.
In 2011, Singapore authority launched new property measures aiming to
fight against property bubbles. Among other measures, the speculative tax
is sharply increased. Specifically, any residential property which is sold in
the first, second, third, and forth year must be subject to the speculative tax
rates of sixteen, twelve, eight, and four percent, which are the highest rates
in the world. This measure against bubbles is supported by the common
wisdom. That is, when speculation becomes very costly to investors due to
the tax, investor might be discouraged to engage in the bubble transaction.
Consequently, there would be no bubble.
Can tax policies prevent the rational speculative bubble studied in this
thesis? To find the answer, the rest of the chapter is devoted to investigate
the most interesting tax policy against bubbles (in the author’s opinion):
the speculative tax. Having the Singapore policy as an example, we need
to slightly modify our setting of economy to allow the speculation. Note
that the resaleability is indeed at the very essence of bubbles in any setup
55This is the scheme which the government guarantees the minimum value of the alter-
native asset. Therefore, the alternative asset dominates housing bubbles.
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analyzed so far, as captured by capital gain from the factory resale. However,
since every model up until now is a two-period-lived agent framework, every
resale is the speculation. In what follows, we extend the time dimension into
a three-period-lived agent model in order to distinguish speculation from
normal factory resale. In particular, speculation is defined as a short-term
resale.
Definition 3.2 A speculation is a short-term resale of assets which its
return comes from pure capital gain. 
3.4.1 Setup
Apart from the bond-financing setup in Chapter 2, agents now live for three
periods: young, middle-age, and old. To maximize his old-period consump-
tion, the contractor invests in capital when young for the long-term factory
buildings production when old via the production function f(kt): f
′(kt) > 0,
f ′′(kt) < 0. It is assumed that he cannot liquidate his capital investment or
in fact he does nothing in his middle-age. For the producer, he invests in
factory buildings when young in order to produce consumption goods when
old via the production function g(xt): g
′(xt) > 0, g
′′(xt) < 0, and Inada
conditions hold. Importantly, he can choose to sell a fraction µt+1 ∈ [0, 1] of
his factory holding for speculative purpose in his middle-age. How this µt+1
is endogenously determined is at the heart of this analysis. For tractability,
it is assumed that this speculative decision must be made in the young pe-
riod, and once the young period is over, this lot of factory buildings can no
longer be used for the consumption good production. This can be justified
that the consumption good production process starts instantly in the young
period, or factory buildings for speculative sale in the middle-age require
special preparation such as advertisement and renovation. For our purpose,
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this speculative transaction is taxed by the rate τ by the government.
To focus on the role of speculative tax, full pledgeability is assumed for
both contractors and producers. As shown in Chapter 2, the full pledgeabil-
ity implies that the credit constraint never binds since the optimal demand
for debt would not cause debt obligation to exceed the high-realization fu-
ture income.
The rest of the model is as in Chapter 2. The capital and factory depre-
ciation rates are 1 and θ ∈ [0, 1) respectively. There is no population growth
and the ratio between these two types of agents is fixed equal to N . Each
agent is exogenously endowed with W when young. The economy faces the
fixed world’s interest rate r∗ ∈ R+ and all markets are competitive. Lastly,
the factory price of the economy follows the stochastic process which creates
the once-and-for-all crash of bubbles on the fundamental price in the same
manner as all earlier models.
3.4.2 Equilibrium
The competition in credit market drives down lending rates to the cost of
fund r∗. As in earlier models, the investment decision of the contractor
follows the no-arbitrage condition below.
pt+2f
′(kt) = (1 + r
∗)2 (3.10)
Then as shown in the following law of motion, the factory stock today
is the sum of the depreciated factory stock from two periods ago, the spec-
ulative factory sale, and the newly-built factory buildings.
xt+2 = (1− µt+1)(1− θ)









Next, the producer decides how much to invest in factory buildings and
how much factory holding to speculate. Given all prices, he solves the fol-
lowing maximization problem. Denote bijt as the period-t borrowing where
i = 1, 2 represents the contractor and the producer respectively and where
j = 1, 2 represents the young and the middle-age respectively.
max
xt,µt+1
g((1− µt+1)xt) + (1− µt+1)(1− θ)
2pt+2xt − (1 + r
∗) b22t+1
st. b21t = ptxt −W
b22t+1 = (1 + r
∗)b21t − µt+1(1− τ)(1− θ)pt+1xt
The first-order conditions address the optimal amount of factory build-
ings xt and the speculation µt+1 the producer should make. The first optimal
condition for xt is the following.
(1− µt+1)MBLP + µt+1MBSP
pt
= (1 + r∗)2 (3.12)
where MBLP = g
′((1 − µt+1)xt) + (1 − θ)
2pt+2 as marginal benefit from
long-term production, and MBSP = (1 + r
∗) (1− τ)(1− θ)pt+1 as marginal
benefit from speculation.
Above condition states that the rate of return on factory investment,
which is a weighted average of benefits from long-term consumption good
production and the short-term speculation, must be equal to the rate of
return on long-term deposit account. If the rate of return on factory invest-
ment is still higher, there exists the arbitrage opportunity for the production
to invest more in factory buildings. The decreasing marginal product of fac-
tory buildings eventually leads to the return equalization.
If the return on speculation is generally not dominated by other invest-
ment alternative µt+1 6= 0, the second optimal condition for µt+1 is presented
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below. This condition simply says that the marginal benefit of speculation
must be equal to its marginal opportunity cost.
(1 + r∗) (1− τ)(1− θ)pt+1 = g
′((1− µt+1)xt) + (1− θ)
2pt+2 (3.13)




= 1 + r∗ (3.14)
Given an initial factory stock x0, equilibrium is defined by sequences




t=0 such that they
satisfy (3.11)-(3.13) and limt→∞
pt+1xt+1
ptxt
≤ 1. As usual, we need to specify
the fundamental price function to construct sunspot bubbly equilibrium later
on. Using the similar definition as in previous chapters, the fundamental
equilibrium dynamics must converge to the factory price and stock steady
state. However, in the presence of speculation µt+1 6= 0, (3.14) suggests that
there is no steady state since (1 − τ)(1 − θ) < 1 + r∗. In other words, if
the producer decides to speculate the factory market, the equilibrium price
must continue to rise forever. From (3.11), this means that the factory stock
also continue to rise forever. Thus, the fundamental equilibrium dynamics

























where z¯ is the corresponding steady state.
This system φ is very similar to any fundamental system we have studied
so far. Nevertheless, the difference of this system is that the time evolution












Figure 3.9: Fundamental dynamics




Figure 3.10: Time path
to have two separate dynamics: the fundamental dynamics in the odd and
even periods. Particularly, given the factory stock x0 and x1, fundamen-










satisfy φ. Since φ is a saddle and the stable manifold forms the strictly
decreasing fundamental price function over factory stock: ρ : R++ → R++
where ρ(x′) > ρ(x′′) if and only if x′ < x′′.
At this point, we have fully characterized the fundamental equilibrium
dynamics. Interestingly, unless xT = xT+1 = x¯, the fundamental price
dynamics exhibit the fluctuation converging to the steady state level. This is
due to the two-period consumption good production scheme that causes the
separation between dynamics of odd and even periods. For example, Figure
3.9-3.10 illustrate one possible example of the fundamental price dynamics
where factory price fluctuates but converges to the steady state price from
below. For a particular pair of xT and xT+1, the fundamental dynamics can
perform an oscillatory convergence toward steady state as well.
More strikingly, there is no speculative activity occurring in the fun-
damental equilibrium dynamics, and hence the speculative tax τ provides
no effect fundamentally. As explicitly argued earlier, for the speculation to
have the same rate of return as other alternative, the factory price has to
appreciate every period, eventually approaching the infinite value of factory
purchase. Rational agents would expect that factory buildings could not
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be afforded for the future generation. By the backward induction, the next
generation would not purchase factory buildings at the speculative price, so
the speculation is not consistent. As a result, the speculative tax imposition
does not affect the fundamental of the economy at all. We can conclude
that speculation is truly a bubble phenomenon.
Remark 3.2 There is no speculation in the fundamental equilibrium
dynamics and thereby the speculative tax plays no role fundamentally.
Proof As argued in the text. 
3.4.3 Sunspot Equilibrium
With the usual Markov process, now the factory price can deviate from
the fundamental level temporarily in the prospect that it would eventually
crash back to it fundamental level ρ(x). This uncertainty affects the deci-
sion making of each agent. For the contractor, the analysis is the same as




Et(pt+2f(kt)− (1 + r2t+2) b22t+1)
st. b21t+1 = ptxt −W
b22t+1 = (1 + r2t+1)b21t+1
where the optimal debt contract implies Et ((1 + r2t+2) b22t+1) = (1+r
∗)2b21t+1
for banks to have zero profit.
The first-order condition is given below.
Et(pt+2)f
′(kt) = (1 + r
∗)2 (3.15)
Consequently, the law of motion for factory buildings changes from (3.11)
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into (3.16).
xt+2 = (1− µt+1)(1− θ)













g((1− µt+1)xt) + (1− µt+1)(1− θ)
2pt+2xt + (1 + r2t+2) b22t+1
]
st. b21t+1 = ptxt −W
b22t+1 = (1 + r2t+1)b21t+1 − µt+1(1− τ)(1− θ)pt+1xt
where according to the optimal debt contract, the expected debt obligation
is the following.
Et [(1 + r2t+2) b22t+1] = (1 + r
∗)2 b21t − µt+1 (1 + r
∗) (1− τ)(1− θ)pt+1xt
Note that the credit constraint is not relevant here since with the full
pledgeability the optimal demand for loan would not cost the producer more
than his future income and the credit constraint is always non-binding.
Thus, the new set of first-order conditions replaces (3.12) and (3.13).
(1− µt+1)MBLP + µt+1MBSP
pt
= (1 + r∗)2 (3.17)
whereMBLP = g
′((1−µt+1)xt)+(1−θ)
2Et(pt+2) andMBSP = (1 + r
∗) (1−
τ)(1− θ)Et(pt+1).
(1 + r∗) (1− τ)(1− θ)Et(pt+1) = g
′((1−µt+1)xt) + (1− θ)
2Et(pt+2) (3.18)
where µt+1 ∈ [0, 1].
This system is very complicated due to the restriction on µt+1 ∈ [0, 1].
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Hence there can be at least two types of sunspot bubbly equilibrium dy-
namics: namely the speculative bubbly equilibrium and the non-speculative
bubbly equilibrium. Firstly, given T , x−1, z0, µ0, and Et−1(pt+1), the specu-







t=0 that satisfy (3.16)-(3.18). Secondly, given T , x−1, z0, µ0,





t=0 that satisfy (3.16)-(3.17) where µt+1 = 0
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.56 As the name suggests, the non-speculative bubbly
equilibrium contains bubbles with no speculation. This is exactly the bub-
bly dynamics studied in any model so far, so we already know the existence
and its topological properties well. In what follows, we will instead analyze
the speculative bubbly equilibrium.
According to (3.17) and (3.18), the following no-arbitrage condition be-
tween speculation and the deposit saving account holds.
(1− τ)(1− θ)Et(pt+1)
pt
= 1 + r∗ (3.19)
Next, consider Et(pt+2). In period t, there are three states of the world
that may take place in period t+2: (A) bubbles still continue in period t+2
into t+3, (B) bubbles crash in period t+2, and (C) bubbles suddenly crash
in period t+ 1. The following table summarizes these states.
56The other possibility is an equilibrium that speculation occurs in some periods. This
case is extremely complicated. Since our focus is not to fully characterize the bubbly
equilibrium but rather to get some insights of speculative tax policy, this case will be
ignored.
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State of the world Probability Associated price
(A) (1− q)2 pt+2
(B) q(1− q) ρ(xt+2)
(C) q ρ(xlt+2)
Table 3.2: Summary of Et(pt+2)









stock conditional on the fact that bubbles have already crashed in period
t+ 1, so the producer knows that there will be no speculation in this state
of the world thereafter.
By using the updated (3.19), Et(pt+2) can be expanded as follows.
Et(pt+2) = (1− q)
2pt+2 + q(1− q)ρ(xt+2) + qρ(xlt+2)

















































Note that using the updated (3.19) in the derivation means that we are
considering the speculative bubbly equilibrium which there is a speculation
in the next period.






























ρ(xt+1) + qρ(xlt+2) (3.20)
Since x−1, z0, µ0, and Et−1(pt+1) are given, µt+1 can be determined
by (3.20). However, the interior solution of µt+1 may not be obtained. In
particular, consider (3.20) more closely. The left-hand side (LHS) is de-
creasing while the right-hand side (RHS) is increasing in µt+1. To check
whether there is an interior solution for µt+1 ∈ [0, 1], we need to check
that LHS ≥ RHS at µt+1 = 0. Although it is impossible to generally
characterize the dynamics of the entire space, the necessary condition that
LHS ≥ RHS at µt+1 = 0 certainly implies that some area cannot have
speculation. For example, the economy at steady state cannot have specu-
lation. To see this, let µt+1 = 0. Then, the system becomes the fundamental
system. Since the economy is at the steady state.
pt = Et(pt+2) = p¯, xt+1 = xlt+2 = x¯












p¯+ qp¯ > p¯
Hence, LHS < RHS at µt+1 = 0. There is no interior solution for µt+1
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which means the steady state cannot be a part of the speculative bubbly
equilibrium dynamics. In other words, bubbles cannot simply emerge at
steady state simply via pure optimistic speculation. However, this does not
imply that there is no such speculative bubbly equilibrium elsewhere. Let us
consider the next example. Suppose τ = 0 and the economy is at the steady
state factory stock x¯. Considering the boundary case where µt+1 = 0, we





























Since τ = 0, only RHS depends on pt. Further, RHS is decreasing in





p¯. We have learnt from the previous example
that LHS < RHS at pt = p¯ and hence there is no interior solution for µt+1.
Thus, given q > (1+r
∗)2−(1−θ)2
(1+r∗)(1−θ) , a sufficiently high initial price pt leads to
LHS ≥ RHS conditional on µt+1 = 0.
57 This means that the interior solu-
tion of µt+1 exists and hence the speculative bubbly equilibrium is ‘possible’
under this initial condition. This example delivers some interesting insights
about speculation. That is, necessary conditions for speculation are high ini-
tial price and high probability of crash. The key explanation is the expected
return of long-term factory resale Et(pt+2). When the price is initially high,









p¯. Next, letting pt → ∞ and LHS > RHS, the
parameter restriction results.
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the crash will be severe. Keeping the factory stock for two periods implies
double chances for the factory to devalue. Thereby, high q and pt induce
low Et(pt+2) which encourages agents to instead start speculating.
Even though we are able to show that there is the interior solution for
µt+1 in the above example, it does not guarantee that there will be the
interior solutions for µt+2, µt+3, and so forth. If there is only one period that
the speculation fails to have the interior solution, the backward induction
will rule out the speculative bubbly equilibrium. Unfortunately, this is as
far as the analytical analysis can go. We can only say that the speculative
bubbly equilibrium is ‘possible’, not surely exists.
Yet, since speculation does occur in reality, we will leave this existence
issue unsolved and simply assume that the economy is on the speculative
bubbly equilibrium before the increase in speculative tax at period 0. In
this way, we can move on to study effects of the speculative tax which is our
main concern.
3.4.4 Effects of speculative tax
Based on the model described earlier, several notes deserve to be mentioned.
• Unaffected fundamental price: In the fundamental equilibrium dynam-
ics, there is no speculative activity and hence speculative tax plays no
role on the fundamental price.
• Anticipated vs. unanticipated tax shock: In our setting, the demands
for factory buildings today are the same either the government sud-
denly increases tax or it announces that the increase will happen
tomorrow. This is trivial since the young producer encounters the
same maximization problem in both cases. Meanwhile, the supplies
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for factory buildings are also the same in both cases since the period-0
middle-aged producer cannot change their speculative decision. Hence,
effects on the economy should be the same in both cases except the
period-0 middle-aged producer pays more tax in the latter case.
• Indeterminacy: When there is a shock in the dynamical system, the
jump variable of the system can jump while the state variable re-
mains unchanged. In our model, the jump variable is factory price p0
and the state variable is factory stock x0. The jump variable would
jump to the level that the corresponding dynamic path leads to the
terminal condition, which is typically the steady state. However, we
are studying sunspot bubbly equilibrium which the price will eventu-
ally discontinuously crash down the fundamental price, so there is no
terminal condition. Generally speaking, this means that p0 can inde-
terminately jump to any admissible level. In our case, the supply of
factory is fixed from the last period. The demand for factory buildings
depends on the entire price sequence which in turn depends on the ini-
tial condition. Ultimately, how the economy reacts to the tax shock
relies on the coordination among agents. There are three scenarios:
(a) p0 may jump to the zone that the new dynamics still follow the
speculative bubbly equilibrium.
(b) p0 may jump to the zone that the new dynamics instead follow the
non-speculative bubbly equilibrium.
(c) p0 may jump to the fundamental price level and there is no bubble
afterward.
• Reduction in the speculative bubbly equilibrium zone: The increase
in speculative tax restricts the price area (a) that generates the spec-
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We have analyzed the example τ = 0 which RHS is decreasing in pt.
If the speculative tax increases τ > 0, the first term in RHS is added
which makes RHS is no longer strictly decreasing in pt. This reduces
the set of pt that makes LHS ≥ RHS given µt+1 = 0, so the area for
the initial condition that µt+1 has an interior solution is reduced.
• Plausible coordination among agents on lower initial price: Although
scenario (a) is possible, it is less plausible on the economic ground.
Assuming hypothetically that the entire old price path is unchanged,
the increase in speculative tax will reduce the return to speculation.
Hence, according to (3.17), the reduced demand to purchase factory
stock for speculative purposes dampens the overall demand for fac-
tories in the current period and the price should fall. As a result,
scenario (b)-(c) are more likely.
• Effects on economy: If scenario (c) happens, the price drops sharply
to the fundamental price level and then dynamically converges to the
steady state. Thus, the speculative tax policy effectively rules out all
speculation and bubbles. If scenario (b) instead occurs, the specu-
lative tax is able to rule out speculation, but bubbles still continue
via long-term factory resale in the same manner as other models we
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studied. This highlights that the existences of bubbles and speculation
are two different phenomena. However, in a little chance that scenario
(a) takes place, the speculative tax policy becomes a total failure. Not
only does the speculative activity continue, but the factory price also
appreciates more sharply according to (3.19).
Overall, the analysis suggests that the speculative tax imposition is po-
tentially a decent policy to fight bubbles, although things may go wrong.
The final remark captures this insight.
Remark 3.3 The increase in speculative tax can either rule out all
speculation and bubbles, rule out speculation but not bubbles, or in the
less plausible event worsen the bubble situation.
Proof As argued in the text. 
3.5 Conclusion
Bubbles can easily emerge in the small open economy due to the abundant
savings available from the rest of the world. To prevent the existence of bub-
bles, the credit channel must be limited. Specifically, the positive feedback
between bubbles and credit provision must be regulated.
Several policies can serve this purpose. However, the regulation of the
credit channel possibly causes negative impact on the fundamental of the
economy. One example of the first-best policy is to impose the rule of
the degree of the collateralization for the credit limit to always be at the
fundamental value of pledgeable income. This can rule out bubbles since
the bubble-induced increase in factory supply would lower the fundamental
price along the bubble path and also reduce the ability to borrow. Hence,
bubbles cannot be sustained. This policy does not affect the fundamental
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equilibrium dynamics since the policy results in the full collateralization in
the absence of bubbles. Nonetheless, this policy requires a deep knowledge
of economy and is hard to implement.
Moreover, the margin constraint is analyzed as an example for the second-
best policy. When the internal funding is proportionally required for the fac-
tory investment, growing bubbles implies more internal funding over time.
Yet, the decreasing-return production function implies that the wage income
would increases at the decreasing rate along the bubble path and thus would
not be sufficient to fuel bubbles.
Finally, the effectiveness of the speculative tax policy against bubbles
is subject to the coordination of belief among agents. The policy may be
very effective by eliminating all speculation and bubbles, or only ruling
out speculation but not bubbles, or in the worst case reversely intensifying
bubble appreciation while speculation still continues.
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